



# DURBAN+10 SYNTHESIS REPORT

Africa's Policy Actions, Lessons & Recommendations in the Implementation  
of Agriculture Sector Decisions of UN Conference of Parties, 2011-2021  
**Revised Final Report, 12 December 2022**

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# DURBAN+10

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## **Disclaimer**

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Durban+10 Synthesis Report, 2011-2022  
**Revised Final Report, 12 December 2022**

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAA:	Adaptation of African Agriculture
ACSAF:	Africa Climate Smart Agriculture Framework
AfCFTA:	Africa Continental Free Trade Area
ADCOM:	Adaptation Communication
AFOLU:	Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
Agenda 2063:	Africa's Agenda 2063
ARBE:	AUC Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy
AU:	African Union
AUC:	African Union Commission
AU GRAP:	African Union Green Recovery Action Plan, 2021-2027
AUDA-NEPAD:	African Union Development Agency
AMCEN:	African Ministerial Conference on Environment
CAADP:	Comprehensive Africa's Agricultural Development Programme
CACI:	USAID Comprehensive Africa Climate Change Initiative
CoP:	Conference of Parties to UNFCCC
CRA:	Climate Resilient Agriculture
CSA:	Climate Smart Agriculture
CSAIP:	Climate Smart Agriculture Implementation Plan
EC:	European Commission
EU:	European Union
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organization
GAFSP:	Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme
FARA:	Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
FARM:	Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission
GRAP:	African Union Green Recovery Action Plan 2021-2027
IFAD:	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGO:	Intergovernmental Organization
INDC:	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
INGO:	International Non-governmental Organization
IPCC:	The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
GCA:	Global Centre on Adaptation
GCF:	Green Climate Fund
GHG:	Greenhouse Gas
KJWA:	KORONIVIA Joint Work on Agriculture
LULUCF:	Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
MTOP:	Medium Term Operational Plan
NAP:	National Adaptation Plan
NAIP:	National Agricultural Investment Plan
NDC:	Nationally Determined Contributions
NDP:	National Development Plan
NGO:	Non-governmental Organization
REC:	Regional Economic Community
RFSP:	World Bank Food Systems Resilience Program
SDGs:	Sustainable Development Goals
SEBE:	AUC Directorate of Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy
SBI:	UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SRO:	Subregional Research Organization
S3A:	Science Agenda for Agriculture in Africa
UNFCCC:	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

## **Executive Summary**

### **Overview:**

This is the executive summary of the Durban+10 Synthesis Report on the United Nations Conference of Parties (CoP) deliberations and decisions adopted at the Summits held over the period 2011-2021 (CoP17 in Durban, South Africa from 28 November - 11 December 2011, and CoP26 held in Glasgow, Scotland over the period 31 October - 13 November 2021). The report reviews and analyses CoP deliberations and decisions and assesses related policy actions by African countries and the international community. It points to somewhat weak and inadequate commitment to agriculture and sustainable food systems as a global community and the need to address this imbalance in future CoP Summits starting with CoP27 at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt on 6-18 November 2022. As host country for CoP27, Egypt has indicated the need for prominence for agriculture and food systems issues.

### **Summary of the Issues:**

The deliberations at the CoP Summits over the past decade from CoP17 - to CoP26 have provided only tangentially for issues on agriculture and food systems. Climate activists and observers have been pungent and harshly critical that the CoP Summits have so far failed to raise to prominence the role of agriculture sector in meeting Paris Climate Change Agreement despite the fact that the sector is the second leading contributor to climate change after energy. In the same vein, CoP decisions have not made significant dent on the strength of policy responses to agriculture issues. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that CoP17 brought agriculture into negotiations and launched the Green Climate Fund (GCF), CoP21 (Paris Climate Conference, 30 November-11 December 2015) launched the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that have featured adaptation and mitigation measures on Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU), CoP22 (Marrakech, Kingdom of Morocco, 7-18 November 2016) brought about Adaptation of African Agriculture (AAA), while CoP23 (Bonn, Germany, 6-17 November 2017) was a pathbreaking summit. It launched the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA) under Fiji presidency and mandated the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Subsidiary Body on Technical and Scientific Advice (SBSTA) to deliberate on the KJWA roadmap and present a report to CoP26. And at CoP26 (Glasgow, Scotland, 31 October - 13 November 2021) a number of organizations in the agriculture and food systems value chains made commitments to halt deforestation in their supply chains.

These are important developments from the CoP Summits that have influenced policy decisions and collective actions on agriculture and sustainable food systems and security on the continent and globally. All African countries today have updated NDCs with robust agriculture measures, a growing number are implementing climate smart or resilient agriculture policies, strategies and programmes. Green growth and recovery strategies and plans are in place, and the African Union Assembly has adopted the African Union Green Recovery Action Plan (AU GRAP) 2021-2027 and the AU has also launched the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032. Major international development partners including the UN, G7, World Bank, EU/EC, USAID are at the forefront of initiatives to assist to respond to climate change induced agriculture and sustainable food systems challenges on the African continent. Some of these interventions are not necessarily linked to CoP decisions, but more to a wider global call for decisive actions on agriculture and sustainable food systems.

Based on the survey conducted among stakeholders on issues relating to the COPs and agriculture a number of findings emerged. Level of awareness of COP decisions on agriculture and food systems is good, but knowledge of influence of specific COP is weak, which points to inadequate composition of country teams and the need for pre-and post-COP briefings and information sharing at the level of countries. COP meetings have influenced CSA capacity building and strengthening programmes as well as policy. They have not however had impact in influencing the development of gender-sensitive CSA framework, policy and support systems, among others. Effectiveness of COPs on agriculture and sustainable food systems is rated fair and thus not very impactful over the past decade.

The survey findings also pointed to key issues that national stakeholders felt should be tabled by negotiators at COP27. Prominent among these are access to climate finance, capacity building and strengthening, private sector engagement, access to technologies as well as support and incentive systems, effective early warning systems for farmers and gender-responsive CSA frameworks.

As regards improvements that national stakeholders would like to see in COP decisions on agriculture and sustainable food systems in order to meet climate change goals and targets, the survey brought up some findings. Prominent among these are the need for support for negotiation capacity building for developing countries, the desirability for UNFCCC subsidiary bodies (SBSTA and SBI) to prioritize issues in agriculture within their present mandates and more effective support to developing countries, enhanced assistance to mitigate GHG emissions in the livestock sector while enhancing carbon sinks and promoting additional tools for assessing and monitoring effectiveness of adaptation interventions, participatory green technologies development and collaborative research.

As regards what do not seem to have worked very well with COPs on issues of agriculture and sustainable food systems over the decade, national stakeholders expressed views, which ranged from inadequate sustained engagement all through the year from one COP to the other, absence of continental stocktaking prior to the next COP, inadequate promotion of locally-tested technologies, a need to ensure better composition of country teams to include senior technocrats, especially at Director level as currently a number of them have never participated in COPs and a need for them to have adequate first-hand information of COP processes, procedures and outcomes.

As concerns what has worked very well for countries' participation in the COPs, respondents to the survey were of the view that a number of these needed to be maintained and further enhanced. Among these is the fact that all countries are invited to the COPs, a feature that is seen as worth preserving. Also is the practice of holding preparatory meetings by various regions. Efforts by the COPs to mobilize climate finance for developing countries and assist in developing context specific solutions that are country-driven are seen as key strong points of the COPs.

### **Conclusion:**

Based on the foregoing, in conclusion, this report expresses the view that it is fair to say that there has been considerably enhanced policy responses to the needs of agriculture sector since the NDCs were launched. This, however, does not mean commensurate flow of resources to agriculture and food systems. Neither have they been the direct impetus for the adoption of CSA in countries. In fact, the agricultural financing gap in many African countries surpasses government budgets and funding currently available from the international development community. Climate finance flows from multilateral development banks to the agriculture sector in Africa increased from US\$433 million in 2015 to US\$2 billion in 2018 and then declined to over US\$1 billion in 2020<sup>1</sup>.

COP meetings have influenced CSA capacity building and strengthening programmes as well as policy. They have not however had impact in influencing the development of gender-sensitive CSA framework, policy, financing and support systems, among others. Effectiveness of COPs on agriculture and sustainable food systems is rated fair and thus not very impactful over the past decade.

On the whole there is a generally felt need for the CoP summits to do more on agriculture and food systems. It is about putting sustainable agriculture and food systems in the core agenda for negotiations, plenary decisions and financing of responses to challenges reflected in continuing climate change induced losses and damage to Africa's agriculture and food systems. On this, attention will be on CoP27 at which the onus will be on Africa to demonstrate leadership in putting agriculture and food systems on the agenda and ensuring a robust decision on programmes and financing, as well as appropriate institutional arrangement for future negotiations as the mandate of UNFCCC subsidiary bodies (SBSTA and SBI) on the KJWA comes to an end.

### **Recommendations:**

Based on the foregoing, this synthesis report recommends the following:

1. If CoP17 brought agriculture into negotiations, CoP22 launched the Adaptation of African Agriculture (AAA) and CoP23 the KJWA and mandated the SBSTA and SBI to consider agriculture, Africa must go to CoP27 with a clear-headed

<sup>1</sup> Brookings, The criticality of climate finance for Africa; Holger A. Kray, ChakibJenane, Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez, and Jamal Saghir , The urgency and benefits of climate adaptation for Africa's agriculture and food security, Thursday, March 24, 2022

position and a solid footprint on climate resilient agriculture and sustainable food systems. This should go far beyond traditional position paper to concrete programmes and financing requirements for climate resilient transition in the sector. Africa must put forward its requirements for just transition in the agriculture sector.

2. Africa should push for the establishment of a dedicated UNFCCC Subsidiary Body on Developing Countries and Agriculture and Food Systems. The current two SBs are overstretched and their mandate on KJWA has come to an end. Nothing concrete has been delivered on the KJWA programme.
3. There is a need for improved composition of country teams attending the COPs. Provision should be made for participation of senior technocrats, especially at the level of Directors of key sectoral ministries and agencies.
4. Country level pre-and post-COP meeting briefings should be encouraged to share information and knowledge of outcomes and follow-ups.
5. There is need for the development of CSA policies, strategies, financing and support systems to be gender sensitive. The COPs over the decade have had little to no impact on gender-responsiveness of CSA practices.
6. Subsequent COPs and national policy responses should focus on climate finance, capacity building and strengthening, private sector engagement, access to green technologies, gender-responsive CSA support and incentives systems and collaborative research.

# I. Introduction

## I.1. Overview

This is the synthesis report on policy actions taken by the African continent in the implementation of decisions adopted at the UN Conference of Parties (CoP) from CoP17 held in Durban, South Africa from 28 November-11 December 2011 to CoP26 held in Glasgow, Scotland over the period, 31 October to 13 November 2021. It is an input for the operationalization of the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032, this synthesis report provides guidance to African countries, Regional Economic Communities and other development stakeholders as the continent prepares to put forward Africa's positions on issues in respect of agriculture and sustainable food systems at CoP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt on 6-18 November 2022. The report also provides guideposts as countries seek to implement their climate smart or resilient agriculture policies, strategies and programmes in response to the devastating and unabating impact of climate change on agriculture and food security on the African continent<sup>2</sup>.

Among others, CoP27 will assess progress on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support. It will also consider the social and economic consequences of measures taken and efforts to address the issue of losses and damage arising from the impact of climate change and assess global collective progress towards fulfilling the Paris Agreement. This synthesis report is about the extent to which issues in agriculture and food systems have been addressed by the CoPs thus far, from Durban to Glasgow and now Sharm El-Sheikh. While on the whole, attention to agriculture sector has not been very encouraging for the African continent that suffers disproportionately more impact of climate change relative to its share of global greenhouse gas emissions, there is some assurance by Egypt, as host of CoP27, that issues on agriculture and food systems and thus the role of agriculture in climate change will be given due prominence.

The recommendations will serve as inputs and programme offerings for enhanced policy actions especially in the areas of climate smart or resilient agriculture policies, strategies and programmes as well as institutional frameworks for governance, management and financing arrangements in the effort to promote transition to CSA practices across the African continent. These recommendations will evolve over time in the implementation of the FARA broader Africa Climate Smart Agriculture Framework (ACSAF). They will therefore continue to undergo reviews and refinements through stakeholder feedbacks and recommendations even after the finalization of this synthesis report.

The delivery of this assignment was undertaken over the period from July to November 2022 and in line with the terms of reference. The context in which this assignment was carried out required strong collaboration across leading regional and continental institutions for the integration of the recommendations into the policy implementation frameworks of the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032 and the AU Green Recovery Action Plan (GRAP)2021-2027.

## I.2. Aim and Objectives of Assignment

The terms of reference of this assignment sets forth the main objective as being to “develop knowledge materials that will inform appropriate policy action at the continental, sub-regional, and national levels for managing climate change adaptation related to agriculture”. To this end, fundamentally, this assignment provides concrete inputs for the implementation of the agriculture and food systems-related components of AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032 and the AU GRAP 2021-2027 and on how sensibly Africa should stand at CoP27 and subsequently on issues of agriculture and food systems. In essence, this assignment aids development of Africa's common position at the CoPs going forward from Sharm El-Sheikh and the implementation of the AU climate change and green recovery strategies. Hence, in addition to the full synthesis report and a policy brief, there will be the need for an

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<sup>2</sup> Climate change predictions remain stubbornly uneasing and unnerving, if not frightening. Recent indications are that millions in the tropics could potentially be exposed to dangerous heat waves for half of the year by 2100, even if Paris Agreement targets are met, and outside the tropics deadly heat waves will become annual occurrences. Beyond 51 degrees Celsius, temperatures are considered dangerously high and unsafe for human beings. The likelihood is high that the Paris Agreement deal of less than 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels may not be met, thus exposing the tropics and the African continent to severe temperatures and weather conditions. This places much of sub-Saharan Africa at considerable risk - see, Lucas Vargas Zeppetello, Harvard University Study Report 2022, Journal of Communications, Earth and Environment, 2022.

Implementation Advisory Memorandum to the AUC providing strands of recommendations on Africa's position<sup>3</sup>.

The specific objectives of this assignment were twofold. These were to:

1. Prepare a continental synthesis report on policy actions, lessons and recommendations in respect of decisions adopted at the UN Conference of Parties from CoP17 in 2011 to CoP26 in 2021 as they relate to agriculture sector and climate change.
2. Present the synthesis report for review and validation at the FARA Biennial Climate Smart Agriculture Conference on 14-16 September 2022<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, this assignment presents a continental synthesis report in support of the launch of FARA ACSAF at CoP27, while contributing to policy actions for the implementation of the AU climate change and green recovery strategies and action plans.

### **I.3. Assignment Delivery Modalities**

Annex 2 presents the modalities for the delivery of this assignment. These consist of the approach, methodology, a clarification of the scope of the assignment, major stakeholders and development partners that were consulted and key documents that informed the analysis in the preparation of the synthesis report.

### **I.4. Assignment Activities, Deliverables and Timelines**

Annex 3 sets out the core activities of the assignment, expected deliverables and the timelines for their production. The assignment was expected to be completed by the end of September 2022. Data and information for the preparation of the synthesis report were collected from three sources: a) a desk review of all agriculture and food systems related decisions adopted at all the UN Conference of Parties over the past decade, responses by African governments including the recent AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032, the AU Green Recovery Action Plan 2021-2027 and numerous reports on Africa's agriculture and food systems with implications for CSA transition on the continent; b) survey of government ministries and agencies, RECs, development partners, IGOs, NGOs and various organizations working in the areas of climate smart or resilient agriculture; and c) interviews of selected policymakers, development stakeholders and partners working on CSA policies, strategies and programmes.

#### **(a) Desk review**

The desk review covered a range of documents. These are listed in Annex 2 of this report. They include decisions adopted at the CoPs, the AU climate change and green recovery strategies, national and regional climate change strategies, CAADP, AU Malabo declaration, reports of international organizations and meetings on agriculture and climate change, among others.

#### **(b) Surveys through questionnaires**

Two sets of questionnaires were developed and administered (Annex 4). One targeted Governments/Ministries of Agriculture and the other was directed at development partners, the private sector and organizations working in the area of agriculture and sustainable food systems in Africa in the context of climate change.

#### **(c) Interviews with selected stakeholders**

In addition to responses to the questionnaires, interviews were held with senior development managers of various agriculture organizations to deepen responses and perspectives on various aspects the synthesis report.

### **I.5 Main Deliverables**

The main deliverables of this assignment consisted of the following:

- An inception report laying out the design of the assignment, the methodology and a provisional outline. This was

<sup>3</sup> The Advisory Memoranda will be submitted through the African Union Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy (ARBE).

<sup>4</sup> Due to the late start of this assignment (end July 2022), the Inception and Progress Report of 18th August 2022 advised that it would not be possible to present a final synthesis report, as consultations would be ongoing by the time of the CSA Biennial Conference in September 2022.

completed on 18 August 2022.

- An interim synthesis report that was presented to FARA Climate Smart Agriculture Biennial Conference on 14 -16 September 2022 and adjusted for comments.
- A final synthesis report with implementable recommendations.

## **I.6 Scope of the Assignment**

The focus of the synthesis report is on all CoP adopted decisions over a ten-year period, 2011-2022, that is from CoP17 in Durban to CoP26 in Glasgow. It will also respond to inputs for the crafting of a common Africa position on agriculture and sustainable food systems at CoP27 and beyond. Its recommendations offer some guideposts or inputs for policy actions in the implementation of the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032 and the AU Green Recovery Action Plan 2021-2027.

## **I.7 Structure of Report**

This report is prepared in five parts. Part I is introductory and presents an overview of the assignment that is guiding the preparation of this Durban+10 synthesis report, the aim and objective of the assignment, the approach and methodology, the delivery modalities and the scope of work involved. This Part also outlines the main deliverables of the assignment and the timelines in their production. Part II reviews issues in climate change, agriculture and sustainable food systems and analyses and presents findings from national consultations undertaken on Africa's policy actions, lessons, and recommendations in the implementation of agriculture sector decisions of UN Conference of Parties over the period, 2011-2021. In Part III, the report examines the UN CoP framework, the summits and their major milestones and achievements, highlights key decisions from CoP17 and CoP26 and reviews decisions of all the CoP summits over the decade from 2011-2021 in the context of the climate change challenges facing sustainable agriculture and food systems. Part IV analyses the effectiveness of the CoP summits and policy responses to deliberations and decisions adopted with respect to agriculture and food systems. It presents major policy responses at continental, national, regional and international levels. And lastly in Part V, the report puts forward conclusions and recommendations on the need to enhance the prominence of agriculture and sustainable food systems issues as Africa looks forward to CoP27 on 6-18 November 2022 at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt.

## II. Review Of Issues In Climate Change, Agriculture and Findings from National Stakeholder Consultations

### II.1 Overview

This synthesis report is developed in response to the role of agriculture in climate change. The impact of climate change on agriculture and food systems in Africa has been devastating and remain a major threat to lives and livelihoods. Mitigating and adapting to its effects constitute an existential requirement for the African continent. Yet, in turn, Africa needs to play its role in global efforts to reduce the contribution of agriculture to GHG emissions that are responsible for global warming despite the continent's limited share in global emissions. The agriculture sector is the second largest contributor to GHG emissions after energy. It is for this reason that it is of vital importance for Africa to transition its agriculture and food systems from their conventional to climate smart or resilient and sustainable practices. Progress is being made, albeit insufficiently. African countries are heavily dependent on agriculture. Transition holds significant benefits for agricultural productivity, increased outputs, incomes, green jobs and value-chain opportunities.

### II.2 Agriculture in Africa's Development

Despite the impressive growth of Africa's agriculture in the past two decades, Africa's food and nutrition challenges remain enormous and food security precarious. Some 40% of the continent's 1.3 billion people still live below the US\$1.90 per day poverty line. This has been further exacerbated by the devastations caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. MDG 1 had sought to reduce condition of extreme poverty and hunger by half by 2015. Progress was made but was insufficient. The Malabo Declaration of 2014, on the one hand, and UN SDGs 2030 and Africa's Agenda 2063, on the other, placed emphasis on ending poverty in all its forms and ensuring food and nutrition security for all by 2025 and 2030, respectively. Africa, with the support of the international development community, is investing in agriculture and food systems to fight poverty and hunger. At many levels, the right things are being done. But these remain generally inadequate in scope and coordination, and often insufficiently financed during execution.

The situation is being compounded by the effects of climate change, conflicts, farm killings and recently the ongoing Russian-Ukraine conflict. From improved seeds to modern crop protection solutions, to smart technology for farmers in the fields and their access to market information, to making foods fresher, safer, and healthier, Africa's agricultural and food system can and urgently need to be more productive, more sustainable, more efficient, and more interconnected. Significantly enhanced investment in climate resilient agricultural transition with required support systems from policies through to technologies, capacity and financing are critical for the continent to respond effectively to its food security needs in the face of the challenges posed by climate change.

Extreme temperatures<sup>5</sup>, flash floods, wildfires and droughts are increasingly becoming more frequent and intense due to climate change. These are causing mass displacement of people. Drought has placed some 22 million people at the risk of starvation in the Horn of Africa (UN WFP, August 2022). This represents a rise of about 9 million since the start of 2022 for the subregion. WFP stated this is the result of failure of four consecutive rainy seasons, which has pushed populations in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia to the brink of famine. It noted that more than a million people have left their homes in search of food and water.

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<sup>5</sup> Beyond the continent, the issue of unprecedented heat wave has been global this year. In August this year, China warned of the severe threat to autumn harvest from agriculture due to the worst heat wave it has so far recorded. The heat is drying up the critical Yangtze River, with its water flow 50% lower than the five-year average. It is urging crop protection in the face of the country's hottest summer on record...urging water conservation for crops (Greenpeace, East Asia)

### **Box 1: Worrying Insecurity Challenges in Africa's Agriculture and Food Security**

*Africa needs to address the security issue to ease the challenge of food security.*

*African countries are struggling to curb infiltration of insurgents, militants, and bandits across much of the continent. Military operations have been stepped up against these groups in the Sahel region and much of the south of the Sahara Desert, and around the Lake Chad, sections of Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. The security situation is complex and challenging, given the highly motivated and mobile nature of these groups who often use motorbikes to stage ambushes and surprise attacks on villages and farming communities and even military posts and targets. Badly shaken locals are abandoning their villages, farms and livestock. This has made united national and cross-border strategies imperative.*

### **I.3 The Climate Change Context**

Climate change is today the single most significant development challenge facing the global community. Science has been emphatic in linking it to incidents of desertification, droughts, rising sea levels, falling water levels, extreme weather conditions, floods, hydrologic and oceanographic processes, and a number of natural disasters leading to destruction of ecosystems and marine lives, including fresh fish farming on which most rural livelihoods are based on the African Continent. The causes are traceable to human activities that are responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, including unsustainable agricultural practices. Collective commitments and actions by the global community to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are therefore fundamental.

Earlier this year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned of the dangers to humanity of allowing temperatures to rise by more than 1.5°C this century. To keep temperature under this threshold, IPCC called on the global community to cut CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by around 45% by 2030 based on 2010 levels. The need for ambitious emissions reduction targets especially by major emitting countries, decisive collective actions and related mitigation and adaptation measures formed the key issues that the landmark COP26 meetings sought to address in Glasgow, Scotland on 31<sup>st</sup> October – 12<sup>th</sup> November 2021. Climate change is affecting health, lives and livelihoods in every country and much more in Africa. Droughts are leading to water scarcity causing widespread crop failures and threatening food insecurity. Air pollution is negatively affecting health. Frequent flooding is spreading waterborne diseases and wildfires are devastating forests, farms, homes and livestock with far-reaching consequences.

The global community needs decisive and sustained responses to protect lives and livelihoods of both present and future generations. Africa needs to be visible in ongoing efforts not only to cut down on greenhouse gases, but very importantly in the development of new technologies and in promoting advances in science, technology and engineering for the production of environmentally and economically sustainable solutions. Mechanisms for connecting and transferring technical know-how to the continent will go a long way in ensuring its effective participation in current and future efforts in the management of climate change. Even though African countries do not contribute much to global CO<sub>2</sub>, it does not mean that environmentally-unfriendly development strategies should continue to be pursued. Africa must take advantage of being a late starter in development to follow a greener path to growth and sustainable development. Concerted efforts are required to correct for decades of global environmental neglect and the continent has a role to play. The time is now for it to act. And there are promising results as much as daunting challenges.

## **II.4 Consultations on Africa's Policy Actions, Lessons and Recommendations in the Implementation of Agriculture Sector Decisions of UN Conference of Parties, 2011-2021**

### **II.4.1 Overview of Findings**

The draft Durban+10 Synthesis Report was presented at the FARA CSA conference on 14-16 September 2022 in Accra, Ghana. The excellently well-attended conference drew more than 250 physical participants and some more online. Very few issues on the report were raised by participants and also discussed during a panel session. To these, immediate responses were provided. This report adjusts for the feedback received at the conference. Central among these is the issue of access by African countries and organizations to effective, efficient and adequate climate finance. However, the major challenge has been and still remains. And that is, climate finance for what? African countries will need to put forward bankable projects and programmes in order to be able to benefit from international financing for climate change.

Following the CSA conference, this study undertook a survey among all 55 African countries. All ministries of agriculture, livestock, land, forestry, fishery, range, water and rural settlement/development were contacted. There were however only 23 responses. Twelve were through telephones, one was by zoom call and ten filled out the questionnaire. Responses in much of West Africa and the Sahel region were largely absent due to transitional governments. Countries such as Kenya and Lesotho were also in democratic political transitions following elections that brought in a new president and a new prime minister, respectively. In the case of Nigeria, a political transitional process is ongoing with elections due in the first quarter of 2023. Insecurity in much of the African continent and climate-change induced floods that have displaced a large number of farmers and the rural farming community also affected ability of some countries to respond effectively and present credible representation of the situation in respect to the issues raised in the questionnaire.

Despite these challenges, responses were received from 23 countries and these significantly represented the diversity of the agroecological zones and agricultural capacity of the continent – from the leading economies such as South Africa and Nigeria to the most challenged needing immediate support like South Sudan and those in-between. Combined with feedback from the conference and given the situations facing countries in terms of political transitions and insecurity, the indications are that there will be little to no statistically significant difference in the findings of the survey, if it is to be reconducted over and over again.

Annex 4 summarizes the main findings from the questionnaires that were submitted. Not all questions were responded to consistently by the respondents. As a result the average score for each of the questions varied according to the number of respondents. These ranged from 8-10 respondents to the questionnaires.

To enable respondents to freely express their views, the survey made it optional for disclosure of names, positions and titles. The survey also undertook that individual responses would not be identified, and their responses attached to the report. As a result only consolidated results and averaged scores are presented. However, for operational programming and follow-ups, the survey provided for countries with special intervention needs.

A total of 23 countries responded to the survey that was administered directly by email directly to the senior management of agriculture, land, fisheries ministries across the African continent. The distribution of country respondents consisted of Minister, Deputy Minister, Chief Directors, Directors, Deputy Directors, Assistant Directors, Principal Officer and a Senior Officer who reported under the guidance of a Minister.

## II.4.2 Analysis of Results

With respect to the survey questions on COPs and agriculture and food systems, the summary of the responses are as follows:

- 1) On a scale of 5-0 (5=excellent, 0=Not aware) kindly rate the extent to which the Government/ Ministry of Agriculture is aware of the major decisions in the area of agriculture and food systems reached at CoP17 – CoP26. Please, tick (✓) as appropriate:

About half of the respondents expressed the view that the level of awareness of major decisions in the area of agriculture and sustainable food systems reached since COP17 on Durban has been good. As the diversity of country's level of presence or representation at the COPs is important for enhanced appreciation of the issues, it would be desirable to ensure across countries adequate composition of country teams and these should include Director-level professionals.

- 2) Which of these CoPs' decisions had the most profound influence on your country's climate smart agriculture policy actions? Please, identify the related agriculture and food systems decision, if possible:

A significant majority of the respondents, more than 85%, was not able to link the specific COPs' decisions to their CSA policy actions. This suggests, among others, the need for appropriate documentation of follow-ups after COP meetings, information sharing across Government entities and most importantly appropriate composition of country teams for COP meetings.

- 3) Which of the following frameworks or actions of your country's climate smart agriculture programme were developed in response to CoPs decisions? Please, tick (✓) as appropriate:

Respondents expressed the view that the greatest influence of COPs decisions on CSA transition and adoption has been on CSA capacity development programmes. This was confirmed by some 67% of the respondents. This was followed by CSA policy with 56%, which is slightly above average of the responses. The others were below average ranging from 11% to 44%. The least influence has been on the development of gender-responsive CSA framework. In other words, COPs decisions have had no impact on gender issues in CSA adoption and transition.

- 4) On a scale of 5-0 (with 5=excellent and 0= not aware), kindly rate the effectiveness of the CoPs in addressing agriculture and sustainable food systems issues in their agendas and adopted decisions. Please, tick (✓) as appropriate:

Respondents rated the level of influence of the COPs as fair on issues of agriculture and sustainable food systems. In essence, the COPs since Durban have not been very impactful on the agriculture sector. There is therefore a need to push for increased attention to agriculture and sustainable food systems at COP27 and beyond.

- 5) Based on your experience in the implementation and management of climate smart agriculture policies, strategies and programmes, **What key issues should Africa put forward on its position at the CoPs?** with respect to agriculture and sustainable food systems? List at least 3.

Box 2 summarises the key issues that respondents felt should be tabled by negotiators at COP27. Prominent among these are access to climate finance, capacity building and strengthening, private sector engagement, access to technologies and support as well as incentive systems, effective early warning systems for farmers and gender-responsive CSA frameworks.

#### **Box 2: Issues Proposed for COP27**

1. *Unlocking the bottlenecks restricting or limiting access to climate finance*
2. *Access to finance by rural farmers*
3. *More capacity building on climate action for agriculture to enable technology development and transfer*
4. *Capacitate parties to empower or engage private sector on climate action and investment*
5. *Resilient seed production and increased support of indigenous seeds adaptive to climate change*
6. *Increase supply and affordability of climate smart machinery and implements*
7. *Strengthen early warning systems and service delivery*
8. *Develop policy for CSA and incentives for adoption of technologies*
9. *Need for increasing access to adaptation and mitigation financing*
10. *Increasing extreme weather events have exposed millions of people, especially small-scale farmers, low-income households and indigenous peoples in developing countries, to acute food and water insecurity.*
11. *Agricultural systems are vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change*
12. *Safeguarding food security and ending hunger and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems should be prioritized.*
13. *Africa should have one voice and be allowed to integrate traditional practices and modern production technologies to avert food insecurity (integrated soil fertility management)*
14. *Capacity for measurement, reporting and verification of greenhouse gases should be developed across all African countries*
15. *Innovation and technology*
16. *Food and nutrition security, including Gender roles*

- 6) **Based on your experience in the implementation and management of climate smart agriculture policies, strategies and programmes, what kind of improvements would you like to see in CoP decisions on agriculture and sustainable food systems in meeting climate change goals and targets? List at least 3:**

Box 3 presents a list of responses by respondents with respect to improvements that they would like to see in COP decisions on agriculture and sustainable food systems in order to meet climate change goals and targets. Prominent among these are support for negotiation capacity building for developing countries, need for UNFCCC subsidiary bodies (SBSTA and SBI) to prioritize issues in agriculture within their present mandates and more effective support to developing countries, support to mitigate GHG in the livestock sector and enhancing carbon sinks, enhanced tools for assessing and monitoring effectiveness of adaptation interventions, participatory green technologies development and collaborative research.

### **Box 3: Proposed Areas of Improvement in COP Decisions on Agriculture**

1. *Capacity building (including available negotiation online training packages) and information exchange in a more structured arrangement with frequent stocktaking.*
2. *Continued training on negotiations helps developed countries' participants benefit from COPs*
3. *Establishment of specific topics that could be followed up in implementation and assist where there is need.*
4. *UNFCCC constituted bodies and operating entities should prioritize addressing issues related to agriculture in their existing mandates and work plans.*
5. *There should be more emphasis on improving sustainable production and animal health, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the livestock sector while enhancing sinks on pasture and grazing land, which can contribute to achieving long-term climate objectives, taking into account different systems and national circumstances.*
6. *Existing tools for assessing and monitoring adaptation and its co-benefits could benefit from further adjustment and new tools could be developed for country-specific circumstances.*
7. *Benchmarking climate smart agriculture practices in Africa*
8. *Capacity building of extension and research organisations*
9. *Participatory technology development*
10. *Access to finance for rural farmers*
11. *Adoption of the food systems approach (production to marketing)*
12. *Nutrition awareness and link to early childhood development*
13. *Policy must be harmonised at all states levels*
14. *Support for less developed nations*
15. *Strengthening research collaboration between north and south*

### **7) Based on your experience in participating at the CoPs, please comment on what has not worked well and should be changed in respect of Africa and responses to climate change challenges in the agriculture sector.**

In respondents' view a couple of things do not seem to have worked very well with COPs on issues of agriculture and sustainable food systems. Box 4 provides highlights of some of these issues. They range from the need for sustained engagement all through the year from one COP to the other, absence of continental stocktaking prior to the next COP, need to promote locally-tested technologies, need to ensure better composition of country teams to include senior technocrats, especially at Director level as currently a number of them have never participated in COPs and have inadequate first-hand information of the processes and outcomes.

### **Box 4: Summary of Responses on What Has Not Worked Very Well**

1. *What has not gone well is lack of understanding for parties to support constant participation throughout the year*
2. *Apart from working on preparations for COPs maybe Africa should include sessions of stock-taking (achievements, challenges, and information exchange) to assess if countries are indeed benefitting from COPs*
3. *Adoption of foreign-developed and not locally tested technologies as a way to reduce the vulnerability of food systems to climate change.*
4. *As a senior technocrat (Director) I have never attended the COPs*
5. *I have not participated in CoP meetings*
6. *Inadequate information and inadequate participation of technocrats from Africa*

- 8) Based on your experience in participating at the CoPs, please comment on [what has worked well](#) and need to be reinforced and strengthened for effectiveness in respect of Africa and responses to climate change challenges in the agriculture sector.

In response to issues that have worked very well for countries' participation in the COPs, respondents were of the view that a number of these needed to be maintained and further enhanced. Box 5 presents a summary of the responses. The fact that all countries are often invited to the COPs is seen as a valuable element that is worth preserving. Also is the practice of holding preparatory meetings by African countries. Efforts by the COPs to mobilize climate finance for developing countries and assist in developing context specific solutions that are country-driven are seen as key strong points of the COPs.

**Box 5: Summary of Responses on What Has Worked Very Well**

1. *Having preparatory meetings for Africa both virtual and physical is a strong point worth keeping*
2. *Acquiring funding for countries also strengthens Africa's position even though not all countries would be covered*
3. *The development of solutions that are context-specific and country-driven, and strategies and their implementation of strategies that are scaled up and customized for local conditions.*
4. *All countries are invited to the COPs*

## III. UN Conference of Parties and Challenges of Climate Change

### III.1 Overview

Africa’s response to the challenges of climate change is in the context of global frameworks. The Conference of Parties (CoP) on climate change has been one of the key global conferences to address issues in climate change at the global level. It is convened under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) - a treaty agreed in 1994. The UNFCCC has about 176 member countries who are signatories to this convention. The conventions hold the member countries to act in the interest of humanity. The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC Convention is “to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the climate system”. It states that “such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, ensure that food production is not threatened, and enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”. (UNFCCC.int).

The CoPs have been held annually for the last 27 years with the aim of accelerating action towards the goals of both the UNFCCC treaty and the 2015 Paris Agreement. They provide a framework for all countries to work together to limit global warming to 1.5°C and give the different sectors, regions, and stakeholder groups an opportunity to dialogue and proffer solutions to climate change issues. CoP26 held in Glasgow, Scotland, under the presidency of the United Kingdom, in partnership with Italy has been considered by many as the most significant climate event since the 2015 Paris Agreement. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) were introduced during CoP 21 of 30<sup>th</sup> November – 11<sup>th</sup> December 2015 in Paris as part of the Paris Agreement and outline efforts from each country to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. Commitments made at the Paris Climate Conference did not come close to achieving the 1.5°C target. The task of moving countries towards this target fell on CoP26, which ended with nearly 200 countries agreeing the Glasgow Climate Pact. Crucially this pact keeps the 1.5°C reduction alive and completes the Paris Rulebook, a set of guidelines on how the Paris Agreement will be delivered including a transparency process to hold countries accountable as they deliver on their targets.

**Table 1: CoP Summits with Major Milestones and Achievements**

No.	CoP	Milestones and Achievements
1	COP 1, Berlin 1995:	The very first summit saw major countries and world leaders officially agree to meet every year to discuss climate change and limit emissions. It was a start, though emissions have yet to be fully controlled.
2	COP 3, Kyoto 1997:	This meeting saw the adoption of the <u>Kyoto Protocol</u> , which promises to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in industrialized countries. In addition, it established the foundation of the carbon market, in an aim to cut carbon emissions by setting limits on emissions and enabling emission units to be traded.
3	COP 13, Bali 2007:	The Kyoto Protocol to be replaced by the Bali Roadmap, which includes all countries.
4	COP 15, Copenhagen 2009:	Keeping global temperature increases below 2 degrees Celsius becomes official. Richer nations also pledge to finance developing countries long-term, committing to provide \$100 billion a year between 2020 and 2025.
5	COP 16, Cancún 2010:	The Cancún Agreements formalize previous commitments set out in Copenhagen. The Green Climate Fund is also created.
6	COP 17, Durban 2011:	All countries agree to start reducing emissions, including the US, Brazil, China, India, and South Africa. A global agreement that comes into force in 2020 was introduced.

7	COP 18, Doha 2012:	The Kyoto Protocol is extended until 2020. This was not supported by the US, China, Russia, or Canada.
8	COP 20, Lima 2014:	All countries agree to develop and share their commitment to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases for the first time.
9	COP 21, Paris 2015:	The Paris Agreement adopted by all to keep global temperature increases below 2 degrees Celsius and aim to limit them to 1.5 degrees.
10	COP 22, Marrakesh 2016	Three documents came from this year's COP as the Paris Agreement came into force. First was the Marrakesh Action Proclamation, a message of support for the Paris Agreement amid change in the White House. Second was the Marrakesh Partnership to strengthen climate collaboration leading up to 2020, and the third was the first meeting of the CMA, a new decision-making body for the Paris Agreement made up of the group of countries who have signed and ratified the Paris Agreement.
11	COP 23, Bonn 2017:	Progress was made on how the Paris Agreement will work in practice. A new process allowing countries to share experiences and good practices called the Talanoa Dialogue was created. A Gender Action Plan was also brought in to ensure women were involved in decisions relating to climate change solutions.
12	COP 24, Katowice 2018	The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) publishes a report two months before the summit that analyses the impact of a 1.5° C global temperature increase, pushing for greater urgency to reduce emissions.
13	COP26:	<p>A new global agreement - the Glasgow Climate Pact - was reached at the COP26 summit. It aims to reduce the worst impacts of climate change - but some leaders and campaigners say it does not go far enough. It was agreed countries will meet next year 2022 to pledge further cuts to emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) - a greenhouse gas which causes climate change. This is to try to keep temperature rises within 1.5° C - which scientists say is required to prevent a "climate catastrophe". Current pledges, if met, will only limit global warming to about 2.4° C.</p> <p>Coal: For the first time at a COP conference, there was an explicit plan to reduce use of coal - which is responsible for 40% of annual CO2 emissions. However, countries only agreed a weaker commitment to "phase down" rather than "phase out" coal after a late intervention by China and India.</p> <p>Developing countries: The agreement pledged to significantly increase finance to help poor countries cope with the effects of climate change and make the switch to clean energy. There's also the prospect of a trillion dollar a year fund from 2025 - after a previous pledge for richer countries to provide \$100bn a year by 2020 was missed.</p> <p>While some observers say the COP26 agreement represented the "start of a breakthrough", developing countries felt not enough progress was made.</p> <p>Fossil fuel subsidies: World leaders agreed to phase-out subsidies that artificially lower the price of coal, oil, or natural gas. However, no firm dates have been set</p>

Sources: Coombs, Charlie, What are the Biggest Achievements from Previous COP Climate Summits? Thred Media, GLOBALCITIZEN, <https://globalcitizen.org/en>, 26<sup>th</sup> October 2021; <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-24021772>, 59238869, 59088498, 59136545, 59131282, 59143027, 35073297, 58874518; COP26 News [www.news24.com/fin24/20211028](http://www.news24.com/fin24/20211028)

**Table 2: Highlights of CoP17 and CoP26 Major Outcomes**

CoP17 Outcomes	CoP26 Outcomes
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Operationalization of the <u>Green Climate Fund</u> that was created at the Cancun COP in 2010</li> <li>2) Adoption of modalities and rules on the Technology Development and Transfer Mechanism</li> <li>3) Support for <u>Capacity Building</u> by all stakeholders - private sector, development partners, UN agencies (through CD framework in developing countries). Emphasis was on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhancing integration of climate change issues and capacity-building needs into national development strategies, plans and budgets.</li> <li>• Increasing country-driven coordination of capacity-building activities.</li> <li>• Strengthening networking and information sharing among developing countries, especially through South-South and triangular cooperation.</li> </ul> </li> <li>4) <b>Need to streamline the <u>LDC Fund project cycle</u> (managed by the GEF) to support NAPAs</b></li> <li>5) <b>Support to LDCs in development of <u>NAPs</u> – calling on developed countries to provide finance, technology and CD assistance</b></li> <li>6) It set out work programme on <u>Loss and Damage</u></li> <li>7) <b>Call for <u>enhanced research and systematic observation</u>– urged regional and international for support in conducting and sharing findings from climate change research.</b></li> <li>8) <b>Provided guidance on the <u>Clean Development Mechanism</u>– refining process, procedures and practices, including issue of carbon capture and storage</b></li> </ol>	<p>(a) <b>Agreements</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <b>Emissions:</b> Countries to meet next year in Egypt to pledge further cuts to CO2 emissions in the efforts to try and keep temperature rises within 1.5°C.</li> <li>2) <b>Coal:</b> Countries to phase down the use of coal as a source of energy.</li> <li>3) <b>Finance for Developing Countries:</b> Substantial increase in funds to assist poor countries. There is prospect for a trillion dollars a year fund from 2025 upwards from the US\$100billion a year that was pledged in 2009 and not attained by 2020 the target date.</li> <li>4) <b>Fossil Fuel Subsidies:</b> World leaders agreed to phase-out subsidies, which artificially lower the price of coal, oil and natural gas. No firm date was, however, set for action.</li> <li>5) <b>Deforestation:</b> More than 100 countries promised to stop deforestation by 2030.</li> <li>6) <b>Methane Gas Emissions:</b> A scheme to cut 30% of methane gas emissions by 2030 was agreed by more than 100 countries.</li> <li>7) <b>Clean Technologies:</b> Financial institutions (the Glasgow Finance Alliance for Net Zero), which control US\$130trillion in global resources agreed to back clean technologies like renewable energy and direct finance away from fossil-fuel dependent industries. This is potentially a game-changer and brings in the private sector in meeting net-zero targets. Forty (40) countries, which represent about 70% of the global economy, committed to making clean technologies the most affordable, accessible and attractive option in emissions-heavy sectors globally before 2030.</li> </ol> <p>(b) <b>Reconfirmed and New Climate Finance Pledges Announced</b></p> <p>The climate change pact reached at COP26 in Glasgow expressly regretted failures to meet past funding target of US\$100billion annually that was set in 2009. Despite the failures, it recommitted to providing US\$500billion for the period 2021-2025.</p>

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) The US pledged US\$11.4 billion per year by 2024, as well as US\$3 billion specifically for climate adaptation.</li> <li>2) The UK announced it would double its climate finance to US\$11.6 billion between 2020 and 2025.</li> <li>3) Canada announced a doubling of its climate finance support to \$5.3 billion between 2020 and 2025.</li> <li>4) Japan offered US\$10 billion over the next five years for reducing emissions in Asia.</li> <li>5) Norway committed to tripling its adaptation finance.</li> <li>6) Australia announced it would double its contribution.</li> <li>7) Spain confirmed an increase in its climate finance pledge by 50% to US\$1.55 billion a year from 2025.</li> <li>8) On 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2021, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) represented by President Félix Tshisekedi, and the Government of the United Kingdom led by Prime Minister Boris Johnson, on behalf of the Central African Forest Initiative<sup>6</sup> (CAFI) endorsed a 10-year agreement (2021-2031) to protect the Congo Basin rainforest, the world second largest rainforest after the Amazon, which extends over 40% of South America. The agreement will unlock multi-donor investments of US\$500 million for the first five years. It will reduce deforestation, promote land use and enhance transparency in natural resources governance, among others.</li> <li>9) The EU, UK, France, Germany and the US promised to offer South Africa US\$8.5billion to accelerate its transition from coal-fired power stations to renewable sources for its electricity<sup>7</sup>.</li> <li>10) Ford, Mercedes-Benz, General Motors and Volvo signed an emissions pledge committing themselves to “working towards reaching 100% zero emission new car and van sales in leading markets by 2035 or earlier”<sup>8</sup>. Toyota had in September 2021 announced it would invest 1.5 trillion yen (US\$13.2 billion) in batteries for electric and hybrid cars by 2030. It is also pioneering production of vehicles that burn hydrogen</li> </ol>
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Sources: Synthesized from various sources including AU GRAP Development Partners and Investors’ Coordination Forum Revised Programme 28th December 2021; BBC reports on COP26: What was agreed at the Glasgow climate conference? <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-24021772>, 59238869, 59088498, 59136545, 59131282, 59143027, 35073297, 58874518; COP26 News [www.news24.com/fin24](http://www.news24.com/fin24) 20211028

6 Supported by the European Union, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Korea, the Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI) is a United Nations Trust Fund and policy dialogue platform that aims to support six Central African countries in pursuing a low-emission development pathway that ensures economic growth and poverty reduction while protecting the forests and natural resources, on which people depend. CAFI thus combines investments and high-level policy dialogue to help its six partner countries implement the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, fight poverty and develop sustainably while being aligned with the post-2020 biodiversity framework. See UNDP 2021

7 The funding, which is still to be unpacked in terms of grants and loans components as well as conditions, is expected to assist the Republic of South Africa to invest in renewable energy, develop sectors which support production of electric vehicles and green hydrogen and enable the state electricity utility, ESKOM, to repurpose coal-fired power stations that are due to be decommissioned in the next 15 years. The funds are also to contribute to just transition for communities that are dependent on the coal industry (coal mining and coal power stations) for greener alternative sources of livelihoods.

8 COP 26 auto emissions pledge commits governments to work towards all sales of new cars and vans being zero-emission globally by 20240, and no later than 2035 in leading markets.

It is noteworthy that Africa has participated in all the CoPs. Two CoPs have been held in Africa, namely, CoP 17 in Durban, South Africa from 28<sup>th</sup> November – 9<sup>th</sup> December 2011) and CoP 22 in Marrakech, The Kingdom of Morocco, over the period 7<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> November 2016. The next CoP on the continent will take place in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on 6<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> November 2022.

### **III.2 Conference of Parties Meetings, Decisions and Issue of Agriculture and Food Systems**

Over the years, CoP meetings have featured a number of headline issues on which decisions have been adopted with a number of them becoming recurring themes on the agendas. Agriculture and food systems, forestry, land use, biodiversity, and ocean management have increasingly become issues of concern in the response to climate change and for which CoP has made decisions over the years. However, there is a growing concern that agriculture and food systems have not been accorded the prominence they deserve. They have not been main plenary agenda items. Rather they have been deliberated upon at the level two technical advisory bodies which report to the plenary. These are the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) (Box 6).

While these bodies have presented reports over the years on agriculture and food systems, it was not until CoP23 that was hosted by Fiji that agriculture took on increasing prominence. This resulted from the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture, which offered a roadmap for addressing agriculture and food systems issues at the CoP. Otherwise, not much attention seems to have been paid to the sector. At the launch of the KJWA, SBSTA was tasked to consult and report to CoP26, which it did. This report will be further considered at CoP27.

Despite being the second largest driver of climate change behind the energy sector, and therefore central to meeting emissions reductions and achieving the 1.5°C target, the general consensus was that the agriculture sector did not feature adequately enough at COP26, and that reliance on major pledges and pacts disguised a lack of detail on exactly how actions would be achieved. Thus far, under the UNFCCC it is only the KJWA program that is focussed on agriculture.

The KJWA is composed of six interrelated topics, namely soils, nutrient use, water, livestock, methods for assessing adaptation, and the socioeconomic and food security dimensions of climate change across the agricultural sector. The process of establishing the KJWA programme was scheduled to be completed at COP26. However, by the end of the meeting there were still many areas of disagreement that needed to be addressed. Furthermore, despite pledging actions, none of the updated NDCs submitted by the G20 nations prior to COP26 included specific targets on how commitments made for their agricultural sectors would actually be achieved in practice. Many of the current challenges in agriculture remain scabrous in nature, whether it is the desire of developed countries to reduce meat and dairy consumption and move towards more plant-based diets, or the difficulty of securing consensus among developing countries, and not much less the elusive issue of farm subsidies. CoP26 did not address these and other challenges<sup>9</sup>. The task now lies with CoP27.

Agriculture plays a key role on both sides of the climate change debate as both a source and sink for GHG emissions. Approximately 20% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions including carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide come from agriculture, forestry and land use. This value increases to 31% when considered across the whole agri-food system and value chains that include crops and livestock. When split individually, agri-food systems globally account for 21% of carbon dioxide emissions, 53% of methane emissions and 78% of nitrous oxide emissions.

Whilst the principal GHG emitted by most sectors is carbon dioxide, the agricultural sector is unusual in that direct emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, in particular, are far higher. Given the importance of these GHG emissions both as key drivers of climate change, and to the agricultural sector, it is therefore critically important to raise the prominence of agriculture in CoP discussions. It is FARA's expectation that this will be the case at CoP27, given the centrality of agriculture in Africa's development.

Table 5 summarizes Decisions adopted at the CoPs and issues relating to agriculture and food systems.

<sup>9</sup> Despite the lack of prominence to agriculture at CoP26, countries at the meeting recognized the urgent need for sustainable food systems to ensure global food security and meet climate objectives on GHG emissions reduction. There was agreement on the need for a transition towards sustainable and climate resilient food systems. Participants acknowledged the key role of soil and nutrient management practices and the optimal use of nutrients, including organic fertilizer and enhanced manure management; and sustainably managed livestock systems, such as enhancing animal health and sinks on pasture and grazing lands. They also noted the importance of scaling up support and resources to achieve inclusive, sustainable and climate-resilient agricultural systems.

On the issue of agriculture and food systems at the CoP, the following are worth noting:

- Since 2017, agriculture issues have been discussed in the context of the KJWA. The KJWA covers a range of interrelated topics including soil biodiversity, livestock, nutrient and water management, food security, the socioeconomic impacts of climate change across agriculture and methods for assessing climate change.
- An open letter to CoP17 climate negotiators had earlier drawn attention to the importance of the agriculture sector. It emphasized the need for at least 70% increase in agricultural production to meet needs of the global population that has crossed the 7 billion mark and is projected to reach 9 billion by mid-century. It emphasized among others that “whilst agriculture is a contributor to GHG emissions, it has significant potential to be part of the solution to climate change. Preserving and enhancing food security requires increasing agricultural productivity whilst at the time adapting to and mitigating climate change. It also requires a shift towards building farmers’ and vulnerable communities’ resilience to climate shocks, and related food price volatility. More productive, sustainable and resilient agriculture requires transformations in how rural people manage natural resources and how efficiently they use these resources as inputs for crop production. For these transformations to occur, it is essential that the world’s farmers, scientists, researchers, the private sector, development practitioners and food consumers come together to achieve climate-smart agriculture”.
- The open letter called on negotiators at CoP17 to recognize the important role of agriculture in addressing climate change so that a new era of agricultural innovation and knowledge sharing can be achieved. Specifically, it called for approval of a Work Programme for agriculture under the SBSTA so that the sector can take early action to determine the long-term investments needed to transform agriculture to meet future challenges<sup>10</sup>.
- Despite the concern expressed in the multi-agency open letter to negotiators, agricultural sector remains inadequately provided for and astonishingly underfunded. As a percentage of total investment, agriculture had dropped from 22% in the 1980s to approximately 6% during CoP17. In absolute terms, this amounted to a drop of roughly half of the funding allocated 30 years ago before CoP17.
- Despite the poor attention to agriculture, a growing number of Africa countries have made progress in the adoption of climate smart agricultural policies, strategies and practices. Some of the CSA practices and solutions being adopted include reducing tillage, expanding crop rotations, planting cover crops and reintegrating livestock into crop production systems<sup>11</sup>. These have proven to reduce agriculture’s own footprint as well as capture some excess CO<sub>2</sub> generated by other industries. The captured CO<sub>2</sub> is being converted into plant material and or soil organic matter, thereby improving soil health and increasing the ability to produce food on the land in the future. The CSA practices and solutions are however not yet very widespread across the continent partly due to barriers faced by farmers. Based on a review of countries’ experiences, preliminary assessment points to the following factors:
  - Lack of assurance of immediate success.
  - Difficulty and cost of accessing sustainable inputs.
  - Decreased yields during transition process which leads to income loss.
  - Government trade policies (low import duties), which tend to favour consumers over producers, keep prices artificially low and discourage adoption of sustainable high-yield practices.

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10 See [www.imperial.ac.uk/news/104892/agriculture-call-action-cop17-climate-change/amp/](http://www.imperial.ac.uk/news/104892/agriculture-call-action-cop17-climate-change/amp/). This letter was endorsed by major global organizations, which included the following:

- UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
- UN World Food Programme (WFP)
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
- The World Bank
- CGIAR Research Programme on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS)
- Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU)
- International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
- Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR)
- Food, Agriculture and Natural Resource Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN)
- World Farmers’ Organisation (WFO)
- Global Donor Platform for Rural Development
- ACP/EU Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA)
- Farming First
- Danish Agriculture and Food Council
- Agriculture for Impact

11 FARA, Africa CSA Implementation Plan 2022-2032 (Interim Report, 30 August 2022)

- Difficulty of accessing agricultural finance. Capital seems often more available to farmers with traditional and low-return production systems, which incidentally are the least regenerative, GHG-intensive and prone to land degradation.
  - Lack of incentive systems and mechanisms for compensating farmers for adopting environmentally friendly practices and sequestering CO<sub>2</sub>.
  - Lack of data and information on CSA management practices and ways to measure impact of these solutions and practices on CO<sub>2</sub> so as to know how much contribution is being made by a farmer in carbon sequestration.
  - Inadequate de-risking mechanisms to encourage finance institutions to support farmers. Such include supportive government policies - subsidies and regulations - e.g., subsidized crop insurance that focus on both quantity of food supply as well as on their nutritional value and environmental impact.
  - Inadequate financing for fundamental research and innovation in CSA agricultural practices and solutions. In the absence of funding, public research institutions have had to take the easier path that focuses on identifying ways of maximizing farm yields through mono-cropping and chemical usage, both of which increase agriculture emissions.
- Agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) is currently about the only sector with serious potential to become a net emissions sink, which is with the potential to pull more GHG gases out of the atmosphere than it emits. This makes AFOLU pivotal to reaching net zero emissions. To achieve a stable climate, there is a critical need to put more emphasis and resources toward transforming AFOLU from a net source of emissions to a net sink—the kind of focus that is making transformative change achievable in sectors such as power generation and transport<sup>12</sup>.
  - AFOLU and downstream activities in the food system are also central to achieving climate change goals through protection of communities and natural habitats from the effects of climate change. For communities, the food system is currently the world’s largest employer. There is need to continue to leverage the demonstrated ability of food systems to improve livelihoods for billions of people. With respect to natural habitats, food systems drive about 60% of global biodiversity loss There is need for more sustainable food systems<sup>13</sup>.
  - As pointed out by IFPRI, successes in power systems and transport hint at what could be achieved by aiming a brighter spotlight on AFOLU and food systems. AFOLU and food systems require a similar innovation push and investments. Achieving climate goals in AFOLU and food systems will require new policies, innovative governance arrangements, and reformed institutions. It emphasized the need for greater attention and resources to be dedicated to the developing world, where the challenges and opportunities are greatest<sup>14</sup>.
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  - At CoP26, there were promising statements of commitment to AFOLU by major stakeholders including agricultural commodity companies to eliminate commodity driven deforestation consistent with 1.5°C transition pathways. These consisted of pledges to promote agriculture that ends deforestation, as well as sustainable, ethical and responsible production by the food industry so as to curb global warming, conserve natural biodiversity and water resources, and uphold the rights of indigenous communities and small-holder farmers between 2025 and 2030. The pledges also sought to promote revitalization of landscapes through regenerative agriculture and grazing practices and protecting forests and their surrounding ecosystems. The agricultural commodity companies also pledged to build farmers’ capacity to produce food in ways that respect nature and improve their livelihoods and proposed to support financing facilities that are linked to sustainability performance and traceability, including more rigorous social and environmental assessments of commodities in areas of risk<sup>15</sup>.

12 See: Arndt, Channing, The Role of Agriculture and Food Systems in Achieving Net Zero Global Emissions, IFPRI Blog, Issue Post, 24th November 2021

13 Idem

14 Idem

15 <https://ukcop26.org/agricultural-commodity-companies-corporate-statement-of-purpose/>

## **Box 6: UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies<sup>16</sup>**

### **Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice**

The UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA) is one of two permanent subsidiary bodies to the Convention established by the COP/CMP. It supports the work of the COP, the CMP and the CMA through the provision of timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters as they relate to the Convention, its Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Key areas of work for the SBSTA include the impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, promoting the development and transfer of environmentally-sound technologies and conducting technical work to improve the guidelines for preparing and reviewing greenhouse gas emission inventories from Annex I Parties. The SBSTA carries out methodological work under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, and promotes collaboration in the field of research and systematic observation of the climate system. In addition, the SBSTA plays an important role as the link between the scientific information provided by expert sources such as the IPCC on the one hand, and the policy-oriented needs of the COP on the other hand. It works closely with the IPCC, sometimes requesting specific information or reports from it, and also collaborates with other relevant international organizations that share the common objective of sustainable development.

The SBSTA and SBI work together on cross-cutting issues that touch on both their areas of expertise. These include the vulnerability of developing countries to climate change and response measures, discussions under the Technology Mechanism, the Adaptation Committee and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts. The SBSTA and the SBI have traditionally met in parallel, twice a year. When they are not meeting in conjunction with the COP, the subsidiary bodies usually convene at the seat of the secretariat in Bonn, Germany.

### **Subsidiary Body for Implementation**

The UNFCCC **Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)**, and its work has been at the heart of all implementation issues under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and more recently the Paris Agreement. In this respect, its agenda is shaped around the key building blocks of implementation of all these treaties and instruments: transparency, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and capacity-building, and aims at enhancing the ambition of Parties on all aspects of its agenda. As of 2014, the SBI increasingly focused towards advancing the MRV issues as outlined in the Cancun framework with the launch of two processes, the international assessment and review process (IAR) and the international consultations and analysis process (ICA) that are conducted under the SBI. The IAR aim is to promote the comparability of efforts among all developed country Parties with regard to their quantified economy-wide emission limitation and reduction targets. The international consultations and analysis process (ICA) aim is to increase the transparency of mitigation actions, their effects and capacity building needs, in a manner that is non-intrusive, non-punitive and respectful of the national sovereignty.

In addition, the SBI is considering annually GHG emission trends of developed countries and periodically reports of policies and actions by both, developed and developing countries that allows to keeping track of global emissions, mitigation and adaptation policies and actions and actions in the area of financial, technology and capacity building support, research and systematic observation and education, training and public awareness. By providing guidance to the Consultative Group of Experts on non-Annex I national communications, SBI is contributing to strengthening capacity of developing countries to assess their implementation of the requirements under the UNFCCC and report thereof. On mitigation, the SBI is engaged in elaborating guidance for Parties and other stakeholders on how to harness the benefits from more than 10-year experience in implementing the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, namely Joint Implementation and Clean Development mechanisms to shape these mechanisms and also the mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement towards greater efficiency and ensuring real and

<sup>16</sup>

<https://unfccc.int>

measurable emission reductions. The SBI is also looking at the institutional and finance aspects of actions taken by developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation with a view to fully utilizing the available mitigation potential and bringing multiple benefits to people and economies of these countries.

awareness, public participation, public access to information, and regional and international cooperation into all mitigation and adaptation activities implemented under the Convention, as well as under the Paris Agreement.

The SBI is the body that considers the **biennial work programmes for the secretariat**, which provide the strategic direction on how the secretariat can best serve the Parties and the UNFCCC process towards greater ambition of climate change action and support that is fully commensurate with the objectives of the convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

The SBI and SBSTA are also engaged in showcasing climate action by Parties and non-Party stakeholders in the context of the **Technical Examination Process (TEP)**. The TEP for adaptation seeks to identify concrete opportunities for strengthening resilience, reducing vulnerabilities, and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions. The TEP for mitigation explores high-potential mitigation policies, practices and technologies with significant sustainable development co-benefits that could increase the mitigation ambition of pre-2020 climate action.

The LDCs are also supported by a Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) that provides technical support and advice, and the SBI regularly monitors and reviews its work, to ensure that the needs of such countries are adequately addressed. The SBI is also assessing progress made in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans (NAPs). The process was established to enable Parties to formulate and implement NAPs as a means of identifying medium- and long-term adaptation needs and developing and implementing strategies and programmes to address those needs.

The SBI works together with the SBSTA on **cross-cutting issues** that are within the areas of competence of both bodies. These include the vulnerability and adaptation of developing countries to climate change and response measures, issues in relation to the Technology Mechanism, the Adaptation Committee and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts. Through the work of these bodies, the SBI and SBSTA help to foster international co-operation and elevate global responses by setting out options and directions for well-designed policies and actions that can work in addressing both, climate change mitigation and adaptation for the benefits of all people.

On **capacity-building**, the SBI regularly **monitors and reviews progress on the implementation of the frameworks for capacity-building** in developing countries and countries with economies in transition (EITs), the two frameworks launched in 2001 at COP 7 to guide capacity-building. The frameworks aim to enable these countries to implement the provisions of the Convention and effectively participate in the Kyoto Protocol process. In 2005, Parties to the Kyoto Protocol decided that the two frameworks are also applicable to the implementation of the Protocol, and the SBI was then mandated to monitor and review progress on the implementation of the frameworks under the Kyoto Protocol as well. To enhance the monitoring and review of the effectiveness of capacity-building within the intergovernmental climate change process, the Durban Forum on capacity-building, designed in 2011, is an annual, in-session event organized under the auspices of the SBI that brings together stakeholders involved in building the capacity of developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change. More recently, the **Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB)**, created in 2015, meets annually in conjunction with the spring sessions of the SBI and addresses current and emerging gaps and needs in implementing and further enhancing capacity-building in developing countries. The PCCB and the Durban Forum report on their work to the COP through the SBI at the sessions of the SBI held in conjunction with sessions of the COP.

The SBI also monitors and review the **implementation of the Doha Work Programme on education, training and public awareness**, and hosts the annual Dialogue on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE). Discussions under the SBI on this matter outline how Parties view the close links between ACE and other items being discussed in the UNFCCC process by encouraging Parties to promote the systematic integration of gender-sensitive and participatory education, training, public

**Table 3: Summary Conference of Parties Decisions, CoP17-26**

S/N	COP Session	Date	Decisions Adopted by the Conference of Parties	Decisions and Issues Relating to Agriculture and Climate Change
1	CoP 26, Glasgow, Scotland Glasgow, Scotland	31 October to 13 November 2021	<p>FCCC/CP/2021/12/Add.1 Decisions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1/CP.26 Glasgow Climate Pact</li> <li>• 2/CP.26 Report of the Adaptation Committee (for 2019, 2020 and 2021)</li> <li>• 3/CP.26 National adaptation plans</li> <li>• 4/CP.26 Long-term climate finance</li> <li>• 5/CP.26 Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance</li> <li>• 6/CP.26 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 7/CP.26 Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility</li> <li>• 8/CP.26 Compilation and synthesis of, and summary report on the in-session workshop on, biennial communications of information related to Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement</li> <li>• 9/CP.26 Enhancing climate technology development and transfer through the Technology Mechanism</li> <li>• 10/CP.26 Review of the constitution of the Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network</li> <li>• 11/CP.26 Second review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CoP26 Agenda had a day focused on nature – which looked at “Ensuring the importance of nature and sustainable land use are part of global action on climate change and a clean, green recovery”. The SBSTA agenda item 8 addressed the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture, thus bringing in issues in agriculture but not the entire food system, which has implications for deforestation and supply chain that are huge contributors to GHG emissions. With food system accounting for as much as 37% of greenhouse gas emissions, this makes it impossible to achieve global climate targets if agriculture is not included in conversations on decarbonization.</li> <li>• Research by the Global Alliance for the Future of Food showed a growing number of countries included food systems in their NDCs for the CoP meeting.</li> <li>• According to the Worldwide Fund for Nature, 20% of the emissions reductions needed by 2030 could be delivered by climate action in the food system. Many countries at CoP26 mentioned the climate impacts of agriculture, but very few outlined concrete plans and specific targets.</li> <li>• Agriculture, for most people, is really a way of life. Hence the devastation by climate change is profound</li> <li>• Some participants argued that addressing climate change is not simply about getting the message into CoP negotiating text, but more about getting the right people together to do the right thing</li> </ul> <p>The SBSTA considered agriculture at its 4th and 6th meetings. The SBSTA and the SBI continued their joint work in addressing issues related to agriculture.</p>

1	CoP 26, Glasgow, Scotland		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FCCC/CP/2021/12/Add.2 Decisions:</li> <li>• • 12/CP.26 Annual technical progress reports of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building for 2020 and 2021</li> <li>• • 13/CP.26 Fifth review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in countries with economies in transition under the Convention</li> <li>• 14/CP.26 Revised terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts</li> <li>• 15/CP.26 Extension of the mandate of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group</li> <li>• 16/CP.26 Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform</li> <li>• 17/CP.26 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts</li> <li>• 18/CP.26 Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment</li> <li>• 19/CP.26 Matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures</li> <li>• 20/CP.26 Gender and climate change</li> <li>• 21/CP.26 Dates and venues of future sessions</li> <li>• 22/CP.26 Programme budget for the biennium 2022–2023</li> <li>• 23/CP.26 Administrative, financial and institutional matters</li> <li>• Resolution 1/CP.26 Expression of gratitude to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the people of the city of Glasgow</li> </ul>	<p>They welcomed the Koronivia Road Map workshops on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved nutrient use and manure management towards sustainable and resilient agricultural systems</li> <li>• Improved livestock management systems, including agropastoral production systems and others</li> <li>• Socioeconomic and food security dimensions of climate change in the agricultural sector held virtually at the UNFCCC Climate Dialogues 2020.</li> </ul> <p>They also welcomed submissions from Parties and observers that served as input to the workshops.</p> <p>Having considered the report on the workshops of the Koronivia Road Map, the SBSTA and the SBI recognized that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Soil and nutrient management practices and the optimal use of nutrients, including organic fertilizer and enhanced manure management, lie at the core of climate-resilient, sustainable food production systems and can contribute to global food security.</li> <li>• Livestock management systems are very vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and that sustainably managed livestock systems have high adaptive capacity and resilience to climate change while playing broad roles in safeguarding food and nutrition security, livelihoods, sustainability, nutrient cycling and carbon management.</li> <li>• Improving sustainable production and animal health, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the livestock sector while enhancing sinks on pasture and grazing lands, can contribute to achieving long-term climate objectives, taking into account different systems and national circumstances.</li> <li>• Socioeconomic and food security dimensions are critical when dealing with climate change in agriculture and food systems. They also recognized the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger by designing sustainable and climate-resilient agricultural systems applying a systemic approach</li> <li>• Recognized the importance of long-term investments in agriculture</li> <li>• The SBSTA and the SBI also noted the importance of scaling up support to enhance action on safeguarding food and nutrition security and ending hunger, aiming for inclusive, sustainable and climate-resilient agricultural systems, taking into consideration the vulnerability of agriculture to the impacts of climate change.</li> </ul>
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2	CoP25, Madrid, Spain	2-15 December 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FCCC/CP/2019/13/Add.1 Decision</li> <li>• 1/CP.25 Chile Madrid Time for Action</li> <li>• 2/CP.25 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts and its 2019 review</li> <li>• 3/CP.25 Enhanced Lima work programme on gender and its gender action plan</li> <li>• 4/CP.25 Workplan of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures and its Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures</li> </ul>	NA

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5/CP.25 Scope of the second periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it</li> <li>• 6/CP.25 Revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on national communications for Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• FCCC/CP/2019/13/Add.2</li> <li>• 7/CP.25 National adaptation plans</li> <li>• 8/CP.25 Annual technical progress report of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building for 2019</li> <li>• 9/CP.25 Review of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building</li> <li>• 10/CP.25 Fourth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Convention</li> <li>• 11/CP.25 Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance</li> <li>• 12/CP.25 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 13/CP.25 Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility</li> <li>• 14/CP.25 Enhancing climate technology development and transfer through the Technology Mechanism</li> <li>• 15/CP.25 Terms of reference for the review of the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention</li> <li>• 16/CP.25 Dates and venues of future sessions</li> <li>• 17/CP.25 Programme budget for the biennium 2020–2021</li> <li>• 18/CP.25 Administrative, financial and institutional matters</li> <li>• Resolution 1/CP.25 Expression of gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Chile, the Government of the Kingdom of Spain and the people of the city of Madrid</li> </ul>	
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3	CoP24, Katowice, Poland	<p>FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1 Decision</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1/CP.24 Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</li> <li>• 2/CP.24 Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform</li> <li>• 3/CP.24 Long-term climate finance</li> <li>• 4/CP.24 Report of the Standing Committee on Finance</li> <li>• 5/CP.24 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 6/CP.24 Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility</li> <li>• 7/CP.24 Modalities, work programme and functions under the Convention of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures</li> <li>• 8/CP.24 National adaptation plans</li> <li>• 9/CP.24 Report of the Adaptation Committee</li> <li>• 10/CP.24 Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts</li> <li>• 11/CP.24 Review of the terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention</li> </ul> <p><b>FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.2</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12/CP.24 Review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network</li> <li>• 13/CP.24 Enhancing climate technology development and transfer through the Technology Mechanism</li> <li>• 14/CP.24 Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention</li> <li>• 15/CP.24 Annual technical progress report of the Paris Committee on Capacity building</li> <li>• 16/CP.24 Least developed countries work programme</li> <li>• 17/CP.24 Dates and venues of future sessions</li> <li>• 18/CP.24 Administrative, financial and institutional matters</li> <li>• Resolution 1/CP.24 Expression of gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Poland and the people of the city of Katowice</li> </ul>	
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4	CoP23, Bonn, Germany	6-17 November 2017		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CoP 23 was a pathbreaking meeting. It introduced the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA). Prior to the KJWA, focus on the role of agriculture in achieving Paris Agreement targets has been somewhat limited and obscured. The KJWA is to this end a landmark achievement in CoP negotiations process.</li> <li>• The CoP23 Presidency of the Republic of Fiji with support from New Zealand jointly hosted the Pacific and Koronivia Pavilion in Katowice, Poland, 2-14 December 2018.</li> <li>• The KJWA was launched at this CoP meeting. It represented a historic breakthrough in UNFCCC COP negotiations in that Parties reached a decision on next steps for agriculture. This decision was the first substantive outcome and CoP decision in the history of the agenda item on agriculture, which has been under negotiation since 2011. The decision requested the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advance (SBSTA) to jointly address issues related to agriculture.</li> <li>• Parties agreed that adaptation and mitigation of climate change challenges faced by the agricultural sector required bold actions within the next decade. Urgent and transformative actions, led by countries, farmers, researchers, investors and the private sector were needed. Actions on the ground, and learning from them, could inform the discussions that would take place in future negotiations. In order for this transformation to occur, agriculture had to be seen in a broad sense as including policies, services and institutions.</li> <li>• The KJWA includes working through workshops and expert meetings, as well as working with constituted bodies under the Convention and taking into consideration the vulnerabilities of agriculture to climate change and approaches to addressing food security. Parties and stakeholders were invited to share their views on the elements to be included in the work, starting with but not limited to the following issues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Modalities for implementation of the outcomes of the five in-session workshops on issues related to agriculture and other future topics that may arise from this work</li> <li>2) Methods and approaches for assessing adaptation, adaptation co-benefits and resilience</li> <li>3) Improved soil carbon, soil health and soil fertility, under grassland and cropland as well as integrated systems, including water management</li> <li>4) Improved nutrient use and manure management towards sustainable and resilient agricultural systems</li> <li>5) Improved livestock management systems</li> <li>6) Socioeconomic and food security dimensions of climate change in the agricultural sector</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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				<p>The work under the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture is to report back to CoP 26 in 2020, which was eventually held in 2021 in Glasgow, Scotland due to the Coronavirus global pandemic.</p> <p>ROADMAP OF THE KORONIVIA JOINT WORK ON AGRICULTURE</p> <p>A roadmap to guide the KJWA was adopted. These consisted of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) 2(a) Five in-session workshops 22 Oct 2018</li> <li>2) 2(d) Nutrient use and manure management 30 Sept 2019</li> <li>3) Future topics and views on the progress of the KJWA 28 Sept 2020</li> <li>4) 2(b) Adaptation, adaptation co-benefits and resilience</li> <li>5) 2(c) Soil, water management and integrated systems 6 May 2019</li> <li>6) 2(e) Livestock management and resilience</li> <li>7) 2(f) Socioeconomic and food security dimensions 20 Apr 2020 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SB49 / Dec 2018 2(a): Five in-session workshop on SB51 / Nov 2019 2(d) Nutrient use and manure management Nov 2020</li> <li>• Report to COP26 on progress and outcomes of work, including on potential future topics SB50 / Jun 2019 2(b) Adaptation, adaptation co-benefits and resilience 2(c) Soil, water management and integrated systems SB52 / Jun 2020 2(e) Livestock management and resilience 2(f) Socioeconomic and food security dimensions</li> </ul> </li> </ol> <p>Until the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture, focus on the role of agriculture in achieving Paris Agreement targets has been somewhat limited and obscured. The KJWA is to this end a landmark achievement in CoP negotiations process. The KJWA however now needs to push for CSA funding arrangements and CoP27 should place special attention African agriculture and the financing of its CSAIPs. The KJWA is driven through deliberations and engagements by the two specialized groups SBI and SBSTA.</p>
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<p>CoP22, Marrakech Kingdom of Morocco</p>	<p>7-18 November 2016</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1/CP.22 Preparations for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</li> <li>• 2/CP.22 Paris Committee on Capacity-building</li> <li>• 3/CP.22 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts</li> <li>• 4/CP.22 Review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts</li> <li>• 5/CP.22 Review and report of the Adaptation Committee</li> <li>• 6/CP.22 National adaptation plans</li> <li>• 7/CP.22 Long - term climate finance</li> <li>• 8/CP.22 Report of the Standing Committee on Finance</li> <li>• 9/CP.22 Terms of reference for the review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance</li> <li>• 10/CP.22 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 11/CP.22 Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility</li> <li>• 12/CP.22 Sixth review of the Financial Mechanism</li> <li>• 13/CP.22 Initiation of a process to identify the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement</li> <li>• 14/CP.22 Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention</li> <li>• 15/CP.22 Enhancing climate technology development and transfer through the Technology Mechanism</li> <li>• 16/CP.22 Third comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity - building in developing countries under the Convention</li> <li>• 17/CP.22 Improving the effectiveness of the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention</li> <li>• 18/CP.22 Outcome of the first round of the international assessment and review process (2014 – 2015)</li> <li>• 19/CP.22 Implementation of the global observing system for climate</li> <li>• 20/CP.22 Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 21/CP.22 Gender and climate change</li> <li>• 22/CP.22 Financial and budgetary matters</li> <li>• 23/CP.22 Administrative, financial and institutional matters</li> <li>• 24/CP.22 Dates and venues of future sessions</li> <li>• 25/CP.22 Rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</li> <li>• Resolution 1/CP.22 Expression of gratitude to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the people of Marrakech</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CoP22 drew attention to the significant threat climate change poses to global food security, stressing that the problem was expected to be worse in developing countries. It emphasized unsustainable agricultural practices were a significant contributor to climate change, calling for efforts to address issues of agriculture both from a mitigation and adaptation standpoint.</li> <li>• In recognition of the important role that agriculture has to play in addressing the causes and effects of climate change 80% of countries included agriculture as part of their mitigation goals in their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), and 64% included agricultural adaptation.</li> <li>• The Adaptation of African Agriculture (AAA) Initiative was launched at CoP22. The initiative, launched in April and officially unveiled at Marrakesh, aims to direct attention, resources, and funding towards adapting agriculture for future climate. AAA aims to raise US\$30 billion to direct towards adaptation efforts on the continent. If AAA is successfully implemented, agricultural production is expected to rise from levels of US\$280 billion across Africa to an estimated US\$880 billion by 2030. The success lies in the availability of funds for adaptation and pledges by rich countries, which have remained largely unmet.</li> </ul>
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6	CoP21, Paris, France (Paris Climate Conference)	30 November - 11 December 2015	<p>FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 Decision</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1/CP.21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement</li> </ul> <p>FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2/CP.21 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts</li> <li>• 3/CP.21 Report of the Adaptation Committee</li> <li>• 4/CP.21 National adaptation plans</li> <li>• 5/CP.21 Long-term climate finance</li> <li>• 6/CP.21 Report of the Standing Committee on Finance</li> <li>• 7/CP.21 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 8/CP.21 Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility</li> <li>• 9/CP.21 Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 10/CP.21 The 2013–2015 review</li> <li>• 11/CP.21 Forum and work programme on the impact of the implementation of response measures</li> <li>• 12/CP.21 Enhancing climate technology development and transfer through the Technology Mechanism</li> <li>• 13/CP.21 Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.3</li> <li>• 14/CP.21 Capacity-building under the Convention</li> <li>• 15/CP.21 Terms of reference for the intermediate review of the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention</li> <li>• 16/CP.21 Alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests</li> <li>• 17/CP.21 Further guidance on ensuring transparency, consistency, comprehensiveness and effectiveness when informing on how all the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, are being addressed and respected</li> </ul> <p>FCCC/CP/2015/10 5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 18/CP.21 Methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits resulting from the implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70</li> <li>• 19/CP.21 Extension of the mandate of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group</li> <li>• 20/CP.21 Technical review in 2016 of greenhouse gas inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 21/CP.21 Administrative, financial and institutional matters</li> <li>• 22/CP.21 Programme budget for the biennium 2016–2017</li> <li>• 23/CP.21 Dates and venues of future sessions</li> <li>• Resolution 1/CP.21 Expression of gratitude to the Government of the French Republic and the people of the city of Paris</li> </ul>	
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7	CoP20, Lima, Peru	1-14 Decem- ber 2014	<p>FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 Decision</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1/CP.20 Lima Call for Climate Action</li> </ul> <p><b>FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.2</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2/CP.20 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts</li> <li>• 3/CP.20 National adaptation plans</li> <li>• 4/CP.20 Report of the Adaptation Committee</li> <li>• 5/CP.20 Long-term climate finance</li> <li>• 6/CP.20 Report of the Standing Committee on Finance</li> <li>• 7/CP.20 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 8/CP.20 Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility</li> <li>• 9/CP.20 Fifth review of the Financial Mechanism</li> <li>• 10/CP.20 Further guidance to the Least Developed Countries Fund</li> <li>• 11/CP.20 Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 12/CP.20 Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</li> <li>• <b>FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.3 Decision</b></li> <li>• 13/CP.20 Guidelines for the technical review of information reported under the Convention related to greenhouse gas inventories, biennial reports and national communications by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 14/CP.20 Training programme for review experts for the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 15/CP.20 Training programme for review experts for the technical review of biennial reports and national communications of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 16/CP.20 Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network for 2013 FCCC/CP/2014/10.5</li> <li>• 17/CP.20 Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network for 2014</li> <li>• 18/CP.20 Lima work programme on gender</li> <li>• 19/CP.20 The Lima Ministerial Declaration on Education and Awareness-raising</li> <li>• 20/CP.20 Forum and work programme on the impact of the implementation of response measures</li> <li>• 21/CP.20 Parties included in Annex I to the Convention whose special circumstances are recognized by the Conference of the Parties</li> <li>• 22/CP.20 Administrative, financial and institutional matters</li> <li>• 23/CP.20 Revisions to the financial procedures for the Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies and the secretariat</li> <li>• 24/CP.20 Dates and venues of future sessions</li> <li>• Resolution 1/CP.20 Expression of gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Peru and the people of the city of Lima</li> </ul>	
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8	CoP19, Warsaw, Poland	11-23 November 2013	<p>FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 Decision</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1/CP.19 Further advancing the Durban Platform</li> <li>• 2/CP.19 Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts</li> <li>• 3/CP.19 Long-term climate finance</li> <li>• 4/CP.19 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 5/CP.19 Arrangements between the Conference of the Parties and the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 6/CP.19 Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility</li> <li>• 7/CP.19 Report of the Standing Committee on Finance to the Conference of the Parties</li> <li>• 8/CP.19 Fifth review of the financial mechanism</li> <li>• 9/CP.19 Work programme on results-based finance to progress the full implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70</li> <li>• 10/CP.19 Coordination of support for the implementation of activities in relation to mitigation actions in the forest sector by developing countries, including institutional arrangements</li> <li>• 11/CP.19 Modalities for national forest monitoring systems</li> <li>• 12/CP.19 The timing and the frequency of presentations of the summary of information on how all the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, are being addressed and respected</li> <li>• 13/CP.19 Guidelines and procedures for the technical assessment of submissions from Parties on proposed forest reference emission levels and/or forest reference levels</li> <li>• 14/CP.19 Modalities for measuring, reporting and verifying</li> <li>• 15/CP.19 Addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation</li> </ul> <p>FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.2 Decision</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 16/CP.19 Work of the Adaptation Committee</li> <li>• 17/CP.19 Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change FCCC/CP/2013/10 5</li> <li>• 18/CP.19 National adaptation plans</li> <li>• 19/CP.19 Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 20/CP.19 Composition, modalities and procedures of the team of technical experts under international consultation and analysis</li> <li>• 21/CP.19 General guidelines for domestic measurement, reporting and verification of domestically supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties</li> <li>• 22/CP.19 Sixth national communications from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 23/CP.19 Work programme on the revision of the guidelines for the review of biennial reports and national communications, including national inventory reviews, for developed country Parties</li> </ul> <p>FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.3 Decision</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 24/CP.19 Revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual inventories for Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 25/CP.19 Modalities and procedures of the Climate Technology Centre and Network and its Advisory Board</li> <li>• 26/CP.19 Budget performance for the biennium 2012–2013</li> <li>• 27/CP.19 Programme budget for the biennium 2014–2015</li> <li>• 28/CP.19 Dates and venues of future sessions</li> <li>• Resolution 1/CP.19 Expression of gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Poland and the people of the city of Warsaw</li> </ul>	N/A
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9	CoP18, Doha, Qatar	26 November - 8 December 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1/CP.18 Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan</li> <li>• 2/CP.18 Advancing the Durban Platform</li> <li>• 3/CP.18 Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity</li> <li>• 4/CP.18 Work programme on long-term finance</li> <li>• 5/CP.18 Report of the Standing Committee</li> <li>• 6/CP.18 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 7/CP.18 Arrangements between the Conference of the Parties and the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 8/CP.18 Review of the financial mechanism</li> <li>• 9/CP.18 Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and additional guidance to the Global Environment Facility</li> <li>• 10/CP.18 Further guidance to the Least Developed Countries Fund</li> <li>• 11/CP.18 Work of the Adaptation Committee</li> <li>• 12/CP.18 National adaptation plans</li> <li>• 13/CP.18 Report of the Technology Executive Committee</li> <li>• 14/CP.18 Arrangements to make the Climate Technology Centre and Network fully operational</li> <li>• 15/CP.18 Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention</li> <li>• 16/CP.18 Prototype of the registry</li> <li>• 17/CP.18 Composition, modalities and procedures of the team of technical experts under international consultations and analysis</li> <li>• 18/CP.18 Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 19/CP.18 Common tabular format for “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”</li> <li>• 20/CP.18 Status of submission and review of fifth national communications from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention and compilation and synthesis of fifth national communications from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 21/CP.18 Capacity-building under the Convention for countries with economies in transition</li> <li>• 22/CP.18 Activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase</li> <li>• 23/CP.18 Promoting gender balance and improving the participation of women in UNFCCC negotiations and in the representation of Parties in bodies established pursuant to the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol</li> <li>• 24/CP.18 Economic diversification initiative</li> <li>• 25/CP.18 Administrative, financial and institutional matters</li> <li>• 26/CP.18 Dates and venues of future sessions</li> <li>• 1/CP.18 Expression of gratitude to the Government of the State of Qatar and the people of the city of Doha</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Following from CoP17, the discussions in Doha at CoP18 was on how to address agriculture in the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA). No ambitious emissions reduction targets were set. This is despite droughts, floods, erratic weather patterns and fires devastating agriculture and food systems worldwide. All this with just an 8<sup>o</sup> C rise in the past century. Scientists now know that even a total 2<sup>o</sup> C rise (global limit) is too much. IATP has long insisted that the primary focus of agriculture discussions in the UNFCCC must be on how agriculture and small producers can adapt to climate change and how the adaptation challenge can be financed.</li> <li>• To effectively address agriculture emissions, setting targets for reducing nitrous oxides and methane from industrial farms and transitioning to agroecological practices are vitally important. The African continent contributes less than 4% of global GHG emissions problem that is devastating its agriculture and food production systems.</li> </ul>
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10	CoP17, Durban, South Africa	28 November – 11 December 2011	<p>           FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1/CP.17 Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action</li> <li>• 2/CP.17 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention</li> <li>• 3/CP.17 Launching the Green Climate Fund</li> <li>• 4/CP.17 Technology Executive Committee – modalities and procedures</li> <li>• 5/CP.17 National adaptation plans</li> </ul> </p> <p>           FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2 Decision           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 6/CP.17 Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change</li> <li>• 7/CP.17 Work programme on loss and damage</li> <li>• 8/CP.17 Forum and work programme on the impact of the implementation of response measures</li> <li>• 9/CP.17 Least Developed Countries Fund: support for the implementation of elements of the least developed countries work programme other than national adaptation programmes of action</li> <li>• 10/CP.17 Amendment to Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 11/CP.17 Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and additional guidance to the Global Environment Facility</li> <li>• 12/CP.17 Guidance on systems for providing information on how safeguards are addressed and respected and modalities relating to forest reference emission levels and forest reference levels as referred to in decision 1/CP.16</li> <li>• 13/CP.17 Capacity-building under the Convention</li> <li>• 14/CP.17 Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 15/CP.17 Revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual inventories for Parties included in Annex I to the Convention</li> <li>• 16/CP.17 Research dialogue on developments in research activities relevant to the needs of the Convention</li> <li>• 17/CP.17 Administrative, financial and institutional matters</li> <li>• 18/CP.17 Programme budget for the biennium 2012–2013</li> <li>• 19/CP.17 Dates and venues of future sessions Resolution 1/CP.17 Expression of gratitude to the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the province of KwaZulu-Natal and the people of the city of Durban</li> </ul> </p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COP17 in Durban made issues relating to agriculture an agenda item under the UNFCCC SBSTA</li> <li>• SBSTA was mandated to start work programmes on:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o The possibility of expanding the activities that could be included for accounting in LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry), i.e., inclusion of certain agricultural activities such as soil carbon)</li> <li>o The possibility of expanding the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to include additional land use, land-use change and forestry activities (i.e., soil carbon)</li> <li>o Figure out how to get carbon credits for soil and better credits for forest carbon in the CDM even though science is demonstrating that carbon cannot be stored permanently in agriculture or forest systems for a number of scientific and technical reasons.</li> <li>o In addition, the SBSTA was asked to initiate a work program to determine how to address “additionality” in LULUCF. The program would focus on how governments can prove that the practices being adopted to reduce emissions or absorb carbon in the soil or forests is actually additional to what they would have done in the first place in a business-as-usual scenario.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• CoP 17 launched the establishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF)</li> </ul>
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Sources: UNFCCC, Reports of the Conference of the Parties Summits (various reports)

## IV. UN Conference of Parties, Agriculture and Food Systems Issues and Policy Responses

### IV.1 Overview

Agriculture contributes an average of about 35% of Africa's gross domestic product (GDP)<sup>17</sup> and is the source of employment for half of the active population of 1.38 billion people. Agriculture and food systems are at the heart of Africa's food and nutrition security. Agriculture is about life and livelihoods for most African communities and a sizable proportion of the continent's population. As a result, it is a source of existential needs to eliminate poverty, create jobs in a green transition context in the face of climate change, generate incomes and create wealth. The practice of agriculture is changing very rapidly, and the sector, more than ever before, now offers enormous opportunities for transition to climate-resilient agriculture practices that provide a suite of green technologies and jobs in the sector. To this end, the transition in agriculture and food systems as a driver of green growth and development plays an important role in efforts to achieve Paris Agreement goals, objectives and outcomes on climate change. The situation on the continent is that Africa is not complacent. It is making the transition, albeit slowly but encouragingly.

This transition is critically important as a 3°C warming trajectory could cause catastrophic disruption to African food systems within the next 30 years. It has been argued that under a 3°C warming scenario, Africa is expected to lose up to 30% of current growing areas for maize and banana and 60% for beans by 2050 and this could potentially raise the number of Africans who are currently under-nourished<sup>18</sup>. Hence, a 1.5°C trajectory provides more options for adaptation of African food systems, but still demands urgent action. Current national pledges seem to put the world on a 2.4°C trajectory even if they are fully achieved. In support of its interventions through its Resilient Food Systems Program (RFSP), the World Bank argued that **while** climate-induced shocks to food systems used to occur once every 10 years on average, they are now occurring every 2½ years. This is too frequent for countries, regions, or farms to sufficiently recover between the shocks, and therefore investing in food systems resilience is key to allowing the African region to act on food systems challenges in more cooperative and effective ways.<sup>19</sup>

In appreciation of the vital importance of agriculture and food systems in the global response to the effects of climate change, in recent years, there has been considerable attention to the state of agriculture and food systems globally and, especially, in Africa, given the devastating scourge of droughts in most parts of the continent as highlighted in Part II of this report. These have been the subject of high-level conferences by the United Nations and the G7 group of wealthy industrialized countries; continental, regional and national meetings, consensus statements by the AU, IGOs, NGOs, development agencies, foundations, citizens groups and research centres globally.

The evidence is strong and consistent that climate change is responsible for a disproportionately significant share of the challenges facing Africa's agriculture and food systems. There are also other causes as well. Among these are conflicts, militant insurgencies, banditry, and cattle herders-farmers clashes all of which have contributed in no small measure to rendering waste farmland and agricultural activities in a number of African countries. These challenges have been recently exacerbated by the global outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic that plunged countries into recession, disruption of supply chains, loss of employment and incomes. Also telling, is the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict that has disrupted access to commodities such as wheat, sunflower oil and fertilizers on which a number of African countries are heavily dependent. Following interventions, shipment of these commodities has recently resumed but still under constrained and uncertain conditions.

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<sup>17</sup> The agriculture sector in SSA, in general, contributes 35% to Africa's GDP, employs 65% of the population, and generates 75% of Africa's internal trade. More than 80% of the rural population in SSA make their livelihoods from small-scale farming that supports over 60% of the region's population. Yet this sector is the poorest and most seriously impacted by events such as natural calamities and pandemics like COVID-19. (Ref: <https://www.irri.org/news-and-events/news/potential-rice-sector-development-sub-saharan-africa-and-opportunities-women>) International Rice Research Institute, Op Ed for International Women's Day 2021); for population figure see: AGRA 2022 Africa Agribusiness Outlook Report – Making Africa and even better Place to do Agribusiness.

<sup>18</sup> IFPRI estimated that by 2050, the 282 million of Africa's population who are undernourished today could potentially grow [to 350 million](#).

<sup>19</sup> Boutheina Guerhazi, World Bank Director of Regional Integration Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, 2022.

The attention to issues of agriculture and sustainable food systems has been encouraging. The G7 at its meeting in May 2022 made this an agenda item. CoP26 brought this to the fore in 2021 and the AU declared 2022 the year of food and nutrition security, among others. Much earlier in 2011, CoP17 raised the issue of agriculture and food systems, while CoP23 launched the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture. The UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) were mandated in 2012 to deal with issues of Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). In-between the CoPs, from CoP24 to CoP26 attention however fluctuated or even waned perceptibly.

In response to the challenges of low-emissions and climate-resilient recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, the African Union Assembly in February 2022 adopted the Green Recovery Action Plan (AU GRAP) 2021-2027 (Box 6). For more decisive action to integrate climate change considerations into development frameworks, processes and programmes at all levels, the AU launched the Africa Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032. Ahead of CoP26 all African countries updated and transmitted more ambitious NDCs to the UNFCCC (Table 2), developed Economic Recovery Plans and Green Growth Strategies and Implementation Plans as well as NDPs that are aligned to the updated NDCs, among other interventions.

All these frameworks put forward ambitious adaptation and mitigation measures for AFOLU. It is also worth noting that for the agriculture sector more than one-third of African countries have had in place climate smart agriculture policies, strategies and implementation plans. There is therefore a growing commitment to transition to climate resilient agriculture and sustainable food systems. For this commitment to be effectively implemented a guiding framework is needed. This informed the developed of an African Climate Smart Agriculture Implementation Plan 2022-2032 by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA).

#### **Box 7: Developing a Unified African Response to Climate Change**

The quest for a unified continental response to climate change is slightly over a decade old. It can be traced back to January 2009. At the time, the AU Commission was mandated by the highest decision-making organ, the African Union Summit, to “facilitate the building of a common African Position on Climate Change in preparation for the fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (CoP15)” in Copenhagen, Denmark scheduled for December 2009. Meeting in Sirte, Libya in July 2009, the Executive Council of the AU adopted a landmark decision on climate change. This decision requested the AUC to collaborate with partners and elaborate a comprehensive African strategy on climate change. The request also sought technical back-up data on the impacts of climate change, economic costs and amount of carbon sequestered in various African ecosystems.

In 2014, the AUC produced the first draft climate change strategy and presented it to the AGN as well as to the African Ministerial Conference on Environment (AMCEN) for consideration. A delay in finalization of the document and changing new realities most importantly the 2015 Paris Agreement had an impact on the completion of the strategy. Between 2018 and 2020 AUC expanded its engagement to include member states and development partners to update the 2014 draft strategy and incorporate the Paris Agreement, emerging science, and recent realities like the one posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic recovery agenda.

Source: AUC, Draft Africa Climate Change Strategy 2020 – 2030, 16<sup>th</sup> October 2020

### **Box 8: African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032**

1) African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032 and African Union Green Recovery Action Plan (GRAP) 2021-2027

African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032: Strategic Intervention Axes and Priorities:

#### **The four main strategic intervention axes are:**

- 1) Strategic Intervention Axis 1: Strengthening Policy and Governance
- 2) Strategic Intervention Axis 2: Adopting Pathways towards Transformative Climate-Resilient Development
- 3) Strategic Intervention Axis 3: Enhancing the Means of Implementation towards Climate-Resilient, Low-Emission Development, Including through Climate Finance
- 4) Strategic Intervention Axis 4: Leveraging Regional Flagship Initiatives

#### **Under strategic intervention axis 2, the Climate Change Strategy proposes the following priority areas:**

- 1) Transforming food systems
- 2) Protecting land-based ecosystems
- 3) Transforming energy systems
- 4) Transforming mobility and transport
- 5) Enhancing inclusive, low-emission industrialization
- 6) Transforming water systems
- 7) Transforming the blue economy
- 8) Digital transformation
- 9) Resilience urban centres

African Union Green Recovery Action Plan (GRAP) 2021-2027: Strategic Intervention Pillars

The AU GRAP has five core areas of interventions called Pillars. These are as follows:

- 1) Climate Finance
- 2) Renewable Energy and Just National Transition
- 3) Climate Resilient Agriculture
- 4) Biodiversity and Nature-Based Solutions
- 5) Green and Climate-Resilient African Cities

## **IV.2 Policy Responses to Conference of Parties Summits Decisions on Agriculture and Food Systems and Security**

Thus, as indicated in the foregoing section, there is a growing commitment to address issues of agriculture and food systems on the African continent. Over the years since CoP17 in Durban, South Africa on 28 November - 11 December 2011, Africa, at continental, regional and country levels, has developed major strategies and programmes and made landmark policy choices and decisions on its agriculture and food systems. The link between these and CoP deliberations and decisions on agriculture was somewhat tenuous until the introduction of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) at the Paris Climate Conference (CoP21) held in Paris, France on 30 November to 11 December 2015 as an instrument for integrating climate change considerations and GHG emissions reduction targets in national development policies, strategies, plans and programmes. Since then, African countries' NDCs have provided for both adaptation and mitigation measures.

Table 4 provides highlights of some of the policy actions relating to the issue of agriculture and food systems

**Table 4: Some Major Policy Responses to Issue of Agriculture and Food Security**

No.	Continental	Regional National and Regional	International
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>African Union Assembly adopted the AU Green Recovery Action Plan 2021-2027</li> <li>African Union developed and launched the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032</li> <li>The African Union Heads of State and Government adopted the Malabo Declaration in 2014 committed to end hunger in Africa by 2025<sup>20</sup> and recommitted to it in successive strategies, including the Africa Agenda 2063.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Launch of National Adaptation Plans and Programmes of Action (NAPs/NAPAs), NDCs<sup>21</sup>, Adaptation Communications to UNFCCC (which overwhelmingly prioritize agriculture for climate action)</li> <li>Development of Climate Change Strategies, Economic Recovery Plans, Green Growth Strategies</li> </ul>	<p>Establishment of Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture at CoP23 in 2017</p> <p>Assignment of UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) jointly with the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI) to KJWA work programme, which was an agenda item at its 4th and 6th meetings.</p> <p>Launch of Adaptation of African Agriculture (AAA) Initiative at CoP22 in Marrakesh Morocco</p> <p>Statements of commitment to AFOLU by major commodity companies to eliminate commodity driven deforestation by 2030 during CoP26</p>
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An African Common Position was put forward ahead of the 23 September 2021 UN Food Systems Summit aimed at transforming Africa's food systems by the next decade in line with Agenda 2063 and the SDGs 2030. The Common Position was anchored on CAADP and the Malabo Declaration of 2014.</li> <li>Africa's Continental Free Trade Area came into effect on 1st January 2021</li> <li>The AU declared 2022 a year of Nutrition in Africa to strengthen resilience in food and nutrition security on the continent.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Africa's NDCs contain adaptation and mitigation measures for AFOLU.</li> <li>World Bank<sup>22</sup> provided a <a href="#">\$315 million loan to support Chad, Ghana and Sierra Leone</a> to increase their preparedness against food insecurity and to improve the resilience of their food systems.</li> <li>World Bank approved a <a href="#">\$500 million Emergency Food Security and Resilience Support Project</a> to bolster Egypt's efforts to ensure that poor and vulnerable households have uninterrupted access to bread, help strengthen the country's resilience to food crises, and support to reforms that will help improve nutritional outcomes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>G7 2015 commitment: The G7 Development Ministers reiterated their commitment to global food security and re-confirmed their goal to help African partner countries lead 500 million people out of hunger and malnutrition by 2030, as decided at the G7 Summit in Elmau in 2015</li> <li>G7 Meeting, 19 May 2022: The G7 Development Ministers of Canada, France, the EU, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America convened in Berlin on 19 May 2022 under the theme "Response to Multiple Crises on the African Continent – focusing on Food Security". They were joined by – Ministers from African countries, to promote an informed discussion on the different causes and dimensions of food security in Africa: Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and Zambia. – International Organizations relevant to the subject of the session: The African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Union Commission (AUC), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank Group (WBG), and the World Food Programme (WFP) also participated.</li> </ul>

20 The number of malnourished people on the continent increased by 46million between 2019 and 2020. Africa is grappling with food and nutrition security. Worsen in 2020 as Covid-19 took hold leaving 1 in 5 facing hunger – about the highest in any region across the world. Africa is a [net food importer at an annual cost of \\$43 billion](#) (World Bank).

21 Richards et al 2016 noted that The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) under the Paris Agreement overwhelmingly prioritized the agriculture sector for climate action and 119 countries included agricultural mitigation in their INDCs and of the 138 countries that included adaptation, almost all of them totalling 127 included agriculture as a priority.

22 World Bank, Food Security Update, 15 August 2022

**Table 4: Some Major Policy Responses to Issue of Agriculture and Food Security**

<p>2</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food security dominated the agenda at the 41st Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union in Zambia’s capital, Lusaka in July 2022. The summit’s theme of “Building Resilience in Nutrition on the African Continent” highlighted the ongoing food challenges that have gripped Africa.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World Bank provided a <a href="#">\$130 million loan for Tunisia</a>, seeking to lessen the impact of the Ukraine war by financing vital soft wheat imports and providing emergency support to cover barley imports for dairy production and seeds for smallholder farmers for the upcoming planting season.</li> <li>World Bank approved a \$2.3 billion <a href="#">Food Systems Resilience Program for Eastern and Southern Africa</a>, helps countries in Eastern and Southern Africa increase the resilience of the region’s food systems and ability to tackle growing food insecurity<sup>1</sup>. The program<sup>2</sup> will enhance inter-agency food crisis response also boost medium- and long-term efforts for resilient agricultural production, sustainable development of natural resources, expanded market access, and a greater focus on food systems resilience in policymaking.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Over the next five years, the United States intends to invest US\$-5billion in food security and nutrition through its Feed the Future Program. The program will promote inclusive agriculture-led growth, improve access to safe, nutritious food, and support climate-smart agriculture. The United States will also invest up to 11 billion dollars over the next three years to address global malnutrition. Accelerating CAADP progress is among USAID’s highest priorities. USAID’s approaches also include partnering with countries to mitigate climate change effects through its recently launched Climate Strategy, through the Comprehensive Africa Climate Change Initiative (CACI), and through country-level National Adaptation Plans; by deploying funding and technical assistance; and by focusing efforts on responding to current crises. Specific priority areas include increasing access to food production inputs, increasing farmer productivity—including supporting women farmers—increasing access to improved technologies and financing, and strengthening private sector markets. USAID’s Nutrition Leadership Council recently updated its nutrition priorities and 13 of 18 countries targeted for strategic support are in Africa.</li> <li>The US aims through its Agriculture Innovation Mission (AIM) for Climate Initiative to close the investment gap and increase collaboration across government and non-governmental partners to support climate-smart agricultural innovation. Five African countries and nine Africa-based organizations have joined AIM.</li> </ul>
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Sources: Synthesized from various documents and reports, including AU strategies and frameworks, G7 meetings reports, World Bank Food Security Update, 15 August 2022, among others

1 Food systems shocks brought on by extreme weather, pest and disease outbreaks, political and market instability, and conflict are becoming more frequent and severe, putting more people at risk of food insecurity. The war in Ukraine is further exacerbating these effects by disrupting the global food, fuel, and fertilizer markets. As a result, an estimated 66.4 million people in the region are projected to experience food stress or a food crisis, emergency, or famine by July 2022. To address these risks, the Food Systems Resilience Program (FSRP) for Eastern and Southern Africa will enhance inter-agency food crisis response strategies—including strengthening early warning systems and rapid response planning, emergency support to producers, emergency trade measures, emergency food reserves—and will include a Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC) to provide agile, rapid funding. It supplements a similar program that the World Bank approved recently for Western and Central Africa.

2 The Food Systems Resilience Program (FSRP) for Eastern and Southern Africa is a World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA)-supported intervention. IDA was established in 1960, helps the world’s poorest countries by providing grants and low to zero-interest loans for projects and programs that boost economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve poor people’s lives. IDA is one of the largest sources of assistance for the world’s 74 poorest countries, 39 of which are in Africa. Resources from IDA bring positive change to the 1.3 billion people who live in IDA countries. Since 1960, IDA has provided \$458 billion to 114 countries. Annual commitments have averaged about \$29 billion over the last three years (FY19-FY21), with about 70 percent going to Africa. The FSRP is central to the World Bank’s engagement in the Africa region, which prioritizes enhancing human development outcomes and increasing the resilience of populations in a region undergoing many challenges.

There is therefore a growing commitment to agriculture and food systems and security. The sources of the impetus however vary and are not necessarily attributable to CoPs decisions. Some of these are as a result of the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, NDC-driven, and increasing calls by developing countries and climate activists for action at various agriculture and food security summits for greater attention by world leaders to agriculture and food systems issues. Commitment and policy actions are also resulting from responses to concerns faced by global food security and the precarious situation in Africa due to conflicts and insecurity. Prominent among these are Global Food Summits<sup>23</sup>, G7 commitments, support by international development organizations such as the EU/EC and the World Bank as well as continental strategies and common positions by the African Union.

The G7, for instance, since 2015, has expressed the aim to transform political commitments into concrete actions as planned by various international initiatives such as the Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission (FARM). G7 Development Ministers have continued to reiterate their commitment to global food security and re-confirm their goal to help African partner countries lead 500 million people out of hunger and malnutrition by 2030, as decided at their Summit in Elmau in 2015. At that Summit the Group highlighted the substantial support provided for food security and nutrition in Africa since 2015 and emphasized the need to mobilize further resources to achieve zero hunger, address food insecurity and support the sustainable transformation of agriculture and food systems in partner countries in Africa, including through support to sustainable agricultural approaches such as agro-ecology. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) was identified as an important inclusive multilateral funding mechanism to support African country food security plans. Complementarily, G7 Development Ministers have continued to encourage African leaders to meet the commitment made in the Malabo Declaration of 2014, where AU member states put further emphasis on increasing efficiency of government budgets allocated to agriculture in a way that maximizes outcome and impact towards building a resilient and productive agriculture sector, to triple their trade in agricultural products and services, and to engage fully in the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP).

In 2022, the World Bank launched its Food Systems Resilience Program (FSRP) to support Eastern and Southern Africa and West and Central Africa. It approved a US\$2.3 billion program to help countries in Eastern and Southern Africa increase the resilience of the region's food systems and ability to tackle growing food insecurity. Similar funding was approved for Western and Central Africa<sup>24</sup>. In May, the World Bank Group and the G7 Presidency co-convened [the Global Alliance for Food Security](#), which aims to catalyse an immediate and concerted response to the unfolding global hunger crisis.

Food systems resilience and food security dominated the agenda at the 41st Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union held in July 2022. The summit's theme of "Building Resilience in Nutrition on the African Continent" highlighted the ongoing food challenges that have gripped the African continent. Earlier, the African Union had adopted the African Union Green Recovery Action Plan 2021-2027 and launched the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032 both of which provide coordinating frameworks for addressing climate resilient agriculture and food systems issues on the continent in a context of the triple challenges of climate change, a global Covid-19 pandemic and insecurity on the continent.

From the foregoing, what seems to emerge is that a number of agriculture and food systems related policy responses at international and national levels as reflected in the launch of NAPs/NAMAs, NDCs, the KJWA (CoP23 of 2017<sup>25</sup>) for which [SBSTA and SBI](#) were assigned responsibility (Box 9) and AAA launched in Marrakesh; the development of some country-level

<sup>23</sup> Welcoming the commitments made at Tokyo Nutrition for Growth Summit 2021, supporting the UN Secretary-General's statement of action at the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS), and cognizant of the African "Common Position" UNFSS document, all participants emphasized that nothing less than a transformation to sustainable and resilient agriculture and food systems is necessary in order to reverse the trend of rising food insecurity and malnutrition. All participants underscored their willingness to pursue an ambitious follow-up to the UNFSS, including by i) implementing their National Pathways to transform their agriculture and food systems focusing on eradicating hunger and malnutrition, recognizing that there is no one-size-fits all approach, and ii) engaging in Coalitions for Action, iii) encouraging partners to support or join the Zero Hunger Coalition. Representatives from regional and International Organizations and the G7 emphasized their willingness to support African states in this endeavour and to align and help strengthen existing African agricultural transformation processes. African states committed to redoubling their efforts to transform agricultural systems with the objective to strengthen enhanced trade and food security on the continent.

<sup>24</sup> World Bank, June 21, 2022

<sup>25</sup> Since 2017, agriculture issues have been discussed in the [Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture](#) (KJWA). The KJWA covers a range of interrelated topics such as soil, livestock, nutrient and water management, food security, the socioeconomic impacts of climate change across agriculture and methods for assessing climate change. Earlier, there had been a call at CoP17 in 2011 for negotiators at CoP17 to recognize the important role of agriculture in addressing climate change so that a new era of agricultural innovation and knowledge sharing can be achieved. Specifically, the call was for approval of a Work Programme for agriculture under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) so that the sector can take early action to determine the long-term investments needed to transform agriculture to meet future challenges. The call contained in an open letter was endorsed by the following major global organizations:

climate-resilient agriculture policies, strategies and programmes (CSAs for which FAO developed a framework); and a host of climate change finance institutions and arrangements (Table 5) are largely the result of the CoPs. However, the overall policy response landscape is considerably more expansive than what CoP Summits may have influenced. Yet, it remains obvious that overall, agriculture and food systems have not featured prominently in CoP deliberations and decisions. Progress on the KJWA was not concrete. Hopefully, CoP27 will represent a big break and deliver an African footprint.

### **Box 9: SBSTA & SBI work on the KJWA and Next Steps**

CoP17 brought agriculture into the negotiations. COP23 marked a milestone for negotiations on agriculture when the KJWA was adopted by the COP23 in Bonn in 2017, through decision 4/CP.23 and mandated the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to discuss agriculture issues and approaches to addressing food security. In May 2018, a KJWA roadmap was set and SBSTA and SBI mandated to hold workshops and experts’ meetings on identified topics covering work to be undertaken until COP26. Parties and observers were invited to submit their views on each topic. UNFCCC secretariat compiled reports on each topic which were considered in the SBSTA and SBI Sessions. In essence, the work on agriculture has been simply on processes and procedures rather than on concrete interventions and financing of programmes. With consultations on the KJWA completed, the future of the KJWA and thus the next steps for the SBST now lies with CoP27.

Based on its work thus far, SBSTA and SBI took cognizance of the following:

1. Soil and nutrient management practices and the optimal use of nutrients, including organic fertilizer and enhanced manure management, lie at the core of climate-resilient, sustainable food production systems and can contribute to global food security.
2. Livestock management systems are very vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and that sustainably managed livestock systems have high adaptive capacity and resilience to climate change while playing broad roles in safeguarding food and nutrition security, livelihoods, sustainability, nutrient cycling, and carbon management.
3. Improving sustainable production and animal health, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the livestock sector while enhancing sinks on pasture and grazing lands, can contribute to achieving long-term climate objectives, considering different systems and national circumstances.
4. Socioeconomic and food security dimensions are critical when dealing with climate change in agriculture and food systems. They also recognized the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger by designing sustainable and climate-resilient agricultural systems applying a systemic approach

UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) UN World Food Programme (WFP) International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) The World Bank CGIAR Research Programme on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU) International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR)	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resource Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) World Farmers’ Organization (WFO) Global Donor Platform for Rural Development ACP/EU Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) Farming First Danish Agriculture and Food Council Agriculture for Impact
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See <https://www.imperial.ac.uk/news/104892/agriculture-call-action-cop17-climate-change/amp/>

26 <https://ccafs.cgiar.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/THE%20KORONIVIA%20JOINT%20WORK%20ON%20AGRICULTURE%20PROCESS.pdf>

**Table 5: Climate Finance Funds and Facilities**

No.	Climate Finance Fund and Facilities	Areas of Intervention				Administrator/ Trustee
		Adapta- tion	Mitiga- tion	Cross- Cutting		
1	The Green Climate Fund (GCF)	√	√	√	World Bank	
2	The Global Environment Facility (GEF)	√	√	√	World Bank	
3	The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)	√	√	√	GEF/World Bank	
4	The Adaptation Fund (AF)	√			World Bank	
5	The Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA+)	√	√	√	European Commission, D-G for Development Cooperation - Europe Aid	
6	The Global Climate Partnership Fund (GCPF)		√		Programme Office of the International Climate Initiative, German Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety	
7	The Weather Risk Management Facility (WRMF)	√			WFP& IFAD	
8	Climate Services for Resilient Development Partnership (CSRDP)	√			USAID	
9	Africa Climate Change Fund (ACCF)	√	√	√	AfDB	
10	The Global Risk Financing Facility (GRiF)	√			World Bank	
11	The Clim-Dev Special Fund (CDSF)	√			AfDB, UNECA & AUC	
12	Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)	√			World Bank	
13	The Global Fund for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)	√			World Bank	
14	TerrAfrica (NEPAD)	√	√	√	AUDA-NEPAD	
15	NEPAD Climate Change Fund	√	√	√	AUDA-NEPAD	
16	The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Project Preparation and Development Facility (PPDF)	√	√	√	DBSA, PPDF Board of Trustees	
17	Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN)	√	√		CTCN Secretariat, Denmark	

# V. Conclusions and Recommendations

## V.1 Conclusions

This Synthesis Report on UN CoP17-26 Decisions and Policy Actions by African countries and the international community points to somewhat weak and inadequate commitment to agriculture and sustainable food systems as a global community and the need to address this imbalance in future CoP Summits. The deliberations at CoP Summits over the past decade from CoP17 - to CoP26 have provided only tangentially for issues on agriculture and food systems. Climate activists and observers have been pungent and harshly critical that the CoP Summits have so far failed to raise to prominence the role of agriculture sector in meeting Paris Climate Change Agreement despite the fact that the sector is the second leading contributor to climate change after energy. In the same vein, CoP decisions have not made significant dent on the strength of policy responses to agriculture issues.

Nonetheless, it must be recognized that CoP17 brought agriculture into negotiations, CoP21 launched the NDCs that have featured agriculture sector adaptation and mitigation measures, CoP22 brought about AAA, while CoP23 launched the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture and at CoP26 a number of organizations in the agriculture and food systems value chain made commitments to halt deforestation in their supply chains. CoP17 launched the GCF, while CoP23 assigned the two UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies SBSTA and SBI to deliberate on the KJWA roadmap and present report to CoP27.

These are important developments from the CoP Summits that have influenced policy decisions and collective actions on agriculture and food systems and security on the continent and globally. All African countries today have updated NDCs with robust agriculture measures, a good number are implementing CSA policies, strategies and programmes. Green Growth and Recovery Strategies and Plans are in place, and the AU has adopted the GRAP and launched a Climate Change Strategy. Major international development partners including the UN, G7, World Bank, EC, USAID are at the forefront of initiatives to assist to respond to climate change induced agriculture and food systems challenges on the continent. Some of these interventions are not necessarily linked to CoP decisions, but more to wider global call for decisive actions.

In conclusion it is fair to say that there has been considerably enhanced policy responses to the needs of agriculture sector since the NDCs were launched. This however does not mean commensurate flow of resources to agriculture and food systems. Neither has it been the impetus for the adoption of CSA in countries. In fact, the agricultural financing gap in many African countries surpasses government budgets and available donor funding. Climate finance flows from multilateral development banks to the agriculture sector in Africa increased from US\$433 million in 2015 to US\$2 billion in 2018 and then declined to just over US\$1 billion in 2020<sup>27</sup>.

COP meetings have influenced CSA capacity building and strengthening programmes as well as policy. They have not however had impact in influencing the development of gender-sensitive CSA framework, policy, financing and support systems, among others. Effectiveness of COPs on agriculture and sustainable food systems is rated fair and thus not very impactful over the past decade.

On the whole there is a generally felt need for the CoP to do more on agriculture and food systems. It is about putting sustainable agriculture and food systems in the core agenda for negotiations, plenary decisions and financing of responses to challenges reflected in continuing climate change induced losses and damage to Africa's agriculture and food systems. On this, attention will be on CoP27 at which the onus will be on Africa to demonstrate leadership in putting agriculture and food systems on the agenda and ensuring a robust decision on programmes and financing, as well as institutional arrangement for future negotiations as the mandate of SBSTA and SBI on KJWA comes to an end.

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<sup>27</sup> Brookings, [The criticality of climate finance for Africa](#); Holger A. Kray, Chakibjenane, Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez, and Jamal Saghir , The urgency and benefits of climate adaptation for Africa's agriculture and food security, Thursday, March 24, 2022

## V.2 Recommendations

Based on the foregoing, this synthesis report recommends the following:

1. If CoP17 brought agriculture into negotiations, CoP22 launched the Adaptation of African Agriculture (AAA) and CoP23 the KJWA and mandated the SBSTA and SBI to consider agriculture, Africa must go to CoP27 with a clear-headed position and a solid footprint on climate resilient agriculture and sustainable food systems. This should go far beyond traditional position paper to concrete programmes and financing requirements for climate resilient transition in the sector. Africa must put forward its requirements for just transition in the agriculture sector.
2. Africa should push for the establishment of a dedicated UNFCCC Subsidiary Body on Developing Countries and Agriculture and Food Systems. The current two SBs are overstretched and their mandate on KJWA has come to an end. Nothing concrete has been delivered on the KJWA programme.
3. There is a need for improved composition of country teams attending the COPs. Provision should be made for participation of senior technocrats, especially at the level of Directors of key sectoral ministries and agencies.
4. Country level pre-and post-COP meeting briefings should be encouraged to share information and knowledge of outcomes and follow-ups.
5. There is need for the development of CSA policies, strategies, financing and support systems to be gender sensitive. The COPs over the decade have had little to no impact on gender-responsiveness of CSA practices.
6. Subsequent COPs and national policy responses should focus on climate finance, capacity building and strengthening, private sector engagement, access to green technologies, gender-responsive CSA support and incentives systems and collaborative research.

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- [www.news24.com/fin24/20211028](http://www.news24.com/fin24/20211028)
- [www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview](http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview)

# **ANNEXES**

## **Annex 1: The Climate Change Context**

### **(a) Overview**

Climate change is today the single most significant development challenge facing the global community. Science has been emphatic in linking it to incidents of desertification, droughts, rising sea levels, falling water levels, extreme weather conditions, floods, hydrologic and oceanographic processes, and a number of natural disasters leading to destruction of ecosystems and marine lives, including fresh fish farming on which most rural livelihoods are based on the African Continent. The causes are traceable to human activities that are responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, including unsustainable agricultural practices. Collective commitments and actions by the global community to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are therefore fundamental.

Earlier this year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned of the dangers to humanity of allowing temperatures to rise by more than 1.5°C this century. To keep temperature under this threshold, IPCC called on the global community to cut CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by around 45% by 2030 based on 2010 levels. The need for ambitious emissions reduction targets especially by major emitting countries, decisive collective actions and related mitigation and adaptation measures formed the key issues that the landmark COP26 meetings sought to address in Glasgow, Scotland on 31<sup>st</sup> October – 12<sup>th</sup> November 2021. Climate change is affecting health, lives and livelihoods in every country and much more in Africa. Droughts are leading to water scarcity causing widespread crop failures and threatening food insecurity. Air pollution is negatively affecting health. Frequent flooding is spreading waterborne diseases and wildfires are devastating forests, farms, homes and livestock with far-reaching consequences.

The global community needs decisive and sustained responses to protect lives and livelihoods of both present and future generations. Africa needs to be visible in ongoing efforts not only to cut down on greenhouse gases, but very importantly in the development of new technologies and in promoting advances in science, technology and engineering for the production of environmentally and economically sustainable solutions. Mechanisms for connecting and transferring technical know-how to the continent will go a long way in ensuring its effective participation in current and future efforts in the management of climate change. Even though African countries do not contribute much to global CO<sub>2</sub>, it does not mean that environmentally-unfriendly development strategies should continue to be pursued. Africa must take advantage of being a late starter in development to follow a greener path to growth and sustainable development. Concerted efforts are required to correct for decades of global environmental neglect and the continent has a role to play. The time is now for it to act. And there are promising results as much as daunting challenges.

### **(b) Africa and Climate Change**

It is common knowledge that the African continent contributes the least to global GHG emissions (about 4% of GHG emissions) but suffers the most devastating impacts of climate change. From the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, to the south of the continent and the small island nations, African countries suffer the challenging effects of extreme weather patterns. In West Africa, for instance, where climate change scenarios suggest an increase in the frequency and intensity of tidal waves and storm surges, a potential sea-level rise of one meter would cause a loss of 18,000 km<sup>2</sup> of land, ultimately magnifying the damage to infrastructure and causing the displacement of populations. There is a strong link between the continent's climate and its development needs and losses. For instance, agriculture and food security cannot be separated from climate change. A 1.5°C - 2°C increase in temperature by the 2030s and 2040s can potentially lead to a 40% to 80% reduction in the area of land suitable for growing maize, millet and sorghum, some of the continent's main staple foods.

Unless bold and decisive action is taken, climate variability and changes pose significant risk with potential reversal effects on Africa's hard-won development achievements and its aspirations for further growth and poverty reduction.

Addressing the effects of climate change is an enormous challenge. The costs of adaptation are staggering and are only set to continue to rise. Unfortunately, the volume of climate finance flowing to Africa pales in comparison with the needs. Current levels of funding for adaptation on the continent amount to at most US\$3 billion per year<sup>28</sup>, which is negligible considering the needs. Despite this challenge, the continent is making determined effort to transform challenges into opportunities by investing resources in support of sustainable development. There is a need to considerably raise investments in and access to renewable energy by the populations and to power infrastructure – schools, healthcare facilities, businesses, and transportation system. The promotion of climate smart agriculture, biodiversity as well as clean, healthy and resilient cities are indispensable priorities.

### Status of Climate Finance Relative to the US\$100billion Target<sup>29</sup>

Year	Amount Provided (US\$ billion)
2013	52.2
2014	61.8
2015	44.6
2016	58.6
2017	71.2
2018	78.9
...	...
2023 <sup>30</sup>	100

Source: OECD

### (c) The COVID-19 Pandemic and Impact on Global CO2 Emissions

When the world came under the grip of the Covid-19 pandemic in January 2020 with the attendant lockdowns, there was a significant drop in global CO2 emissions. The annual growth in global CO2 emissions fell from around 3% in the early years of this century to around 0.9% in the 2010s. Much of this change was due to a move away from coal as an energy source. The global response to the Covid-19 pandemic has become the source of the biggest annual fall in CO2 emissions since World War II. A recent study<sup>31</sup> indicated that emissions declined by about 7% in 2020. Countries such as France and the UK saw the greatest falls, mainly due to severe lockdowns in response to the second wave of infections. Emissions fell in China in February and March 2020 but following the rebound from the coronavirus its overall emissions grew in 2021. In late 2020, China was at least close to having the same level of daily emissions as in 2019 and CICERO estimates suggested the country's emissions may have actually increased for the year 2020 relative to 2019, despite the pandemic.

Accordingly to the Global Carbon Project team, the year 2020 saw carbon emissions decline by 2.4billion tonnes. In contrast, the fall recorded in 2009 during the global economic recession was just half a billion tonnes, while the end of WWII saw emissions fall by under 1 billion tonnes. Across Europe and the US, the drop was around 12% over the year 2020, but some individual countries declined more. For instance, France saw a fall of 15% and the UK went down by 13%.

To meet the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement, global cuts in CO2 emissions will have to be up to 2 billion tonnes every year for the next 10 years. The atmospheric CO2 level and thus the world's climate will only stabilize when global CO2 emissions are near zero. Although global emissions fell in 2020, they still amounted to about 39 billion tonnes of CO2 and thus further increased the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere<sup>32</sup>. Some of the top CO2 emitting countries<sup>32</sup> such as UK and France have a lot of their emissions coming from the transport sector and generally a bit less from industry and other

<sup>28</sup> The US announced a funding support of US\$3billion for climate change adaptation measures during COP26 on 6th November 2021

<sup>29</sup> It was agreed at the climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009 that developed nations would provide US\$100billion a year in climate finance for developing countries by 2020. The target has yet to be met. COP26 in November 2021 recommitted to this pledge

<sup>30</sup> Indications from COP26, November 2021

<sup>31</sup> CICERO 2020/2021; The Global Carbon Project 2020.

<sup>32</sup> The largest contributors to global CO2 emissions are China (10,175 MtCO2), US (5,285 MtCO2), India (2,616 MtCO2) and Russia (1,678 MtCO2). Africa's contribution is negligible. Only South Africa is among the top 20 countries globally with high CO2 emissions. In 2019 its emissions amounted to 479 MtCO2 out of a global total of 36,441 MtCO2. Eswatini (1.4 MtCO2), Nigeria (140 MtCO2). Namibia pop, 2.4m; 4.2MtCO2) Botswana (pop 2.3m, 6.3MtCO2), Zimbabwe (pop 14.6m; 10 MtCO2).

sectors. This is because much of their electricity production is from nuclear energy with some 40% of their emissions coming from the transport sector.

Responses to the Covid-19 pandemic during the first and second waves of infections saw the use of cars dramatically fall during the lockdowns. There has been a significant drop in emissions from the aviation sector – with emissions falling by 40% below 2019 levels. There is therefore a lot that can be learned from the responses to the pandemic for longer term reduction of CO<sub>2</sub>. While a rebound in emissions started in 2021, climate policies can build on the Covid-19 experience. Part of this will include encouraging funding for economic recovery plans and programmes to be appropriately targeted towards green responses. Measures will need to boost initiatives that support less use of vehicles, for instance walking and cycling and deployment of electric vehicles, among others.

#### **(d) The COVID-19 Pandemic and Impact on Africa's Economy**

The COVID-19 pandemic brought about a severe shock to Africa's economy, leaving governments with the dual task of responding to the crisis while also addressing underlying structural challenges. Home to 1.38 billion people, Africa is recovering from the severe socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, economic activities contracted by about 2%. The impact varies across countries. It plunged the continent into its first recession in more than 25 years (World Bank, June 2021)<sup>33</sup> exacerbating vulnerabilities of poor communities and debts of distressed countries. The World Bank estimated that it could push up to 40 million people into extreme poverty and erase at least five years of progress in fighting poverty. Most countries are expected to return to growth in 2021 with significant variations in speed of adjustment. With faster progress in the deployment of vaccines, it is estimated that growth could accelerate to 3.4% in 2021 and 4.5% in 2022<sup>34</sup>. Prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Africa had a GDP growth rate of 3.6% (OECD, May 2020), which was insufficient to accelerate economic and social progress and reduce poverty<sup>35</sup>.

### **II.3 Responses to Climate Change on Africa's Agriculture and Food Systems**

The relationship between climate change and agriculture is well established. Agriculture is a significant contributor to climate change, accounting for between 19% and 29% of total GHG emissions<sup>36</sup>. Agriculture is also one of the sectors most vulnerable to the effects of climate change; consuming some 70% of global freshwater<sup>37</sup> and providing subsistence for about 2.5 billion people globally who depend on it for their livelihood<sup>38</sup>. On average, for the African continent about 60% of the population is employed by the sector. As a result, the impact of climate change on agriculture on the continent is very severe. This however varies between regions and among the countries and predominant crop type. Extreme events, such as floods, droughts, and heat waves, especially when they occur in combination, tend to significantly erode poor peoples' assets and further undermine their livelihoods in terms of labour productivity, housing, infrastructure, and social networks<sup>39</sup>.

An analysis of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted to the UNFCCC ahead of CoP26 by African countries shows virtually countries included agriculture and/or Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sectors in overall mitigation contributions and adaptation measures. Focus on agriculture and food systems has been increased rise since the mid to late 2000s, with particular attention given to agriculture-climate change linkages during the Durban 2011 Conference of the Parties (COP), including attempts to set up a separate Agriculture Working Programme under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While this attempt was initially unsuccessful, the focus on agriculture has continued to grow, until CoP 22 in Marrakech in 2016 laid the foundation for "Action for Agriculture"<sup>40</sup>, which was followed more decisively by the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture that was set up at CoP 23 in Bonn 2017 during Fiji presidency, underscoring the importance of the agriculture sector in adapting to and mitigating climate change.

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<sup>33</sup> [www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview](http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview)

<sup>34</sup> Ditto

<sup>35</sup> OECD Policy Response to Corona virus: COVID-19 and Africa: Socio-economic implications and policy responses, 7 May 2020

<sup>36</sup> See Vermeulen et al., 2012.

<sup>37</sup> See Braimoh, 2013

<sup>38</sup> See FAO, 2013b

<sup>39</sup> see [Olsson et al., 2014](#)

<sup>40</sup> see CTA, 2016

Considerably much earlier, the African Union had long sought to position the continent on the path to integrate climate change considerations into development processes and programmes, including agriculture and food systems. This gave rise to the **Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security** in 2003 [Assembly/AU/Decl.7(II)] when African Heads of State and Government initiated the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme, driven by national CAADP Compacts. To take forward commitment to agriculture, the AU adopted the **Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods** [Assembly/AU/2(XXIII)] ([African Union 2015](#)). That declaration, which was adopted by African Heads of State and Government at the 23rd African Union (AU) Summit in 2014, repositioned agriculture as a priority on the continental development agenda and reaffirmed the CAADP commitments for another 10 years. The CAADP that was developed to promote agricultural transformation across the region and also sought to address the impact of climate change on the continent’s agriculture and food systems. To this end, CAADP hosted the first Africa Climate-Smart Alliance during the UN Climate Week in 2014, which it aligned to the CAADP framework seeking a balance in the trade-offs between economic growth and sustainability.


Over time, more decisively, a number of African countries have launched climate smart agriculture frameworks, strategies and programmes (Fig.1) in response to the challenges of climate change as part of national development visions, frameworks and plans<sup>41</sup> as well as their NDCs.

<b>The Malabo Commitments</b>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Continue pursuing the values and principles of the CAADP process (as contained in the Maputo declaration)</li> <li>2. Enhance public and private investment in agriculture</li> <li>3. End hunger in Africa by 2025 by doubling current agricultural productivity levels and halving post-harvest loss</li> <li>4. Halve poverty by 2025 through inclusive growth</li> <li>5. Triple intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services by 2025</li> <li>6. Enhance resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability and related risks.</li> </ol>	
<b>Implementing Malabo - Strategic Action Areas for the IS&amp;R under the two objectives</b>	
Objective 1: Transformed agriculture and sustained inclusive growth	1a: Increase production and productivity 1b: Enhance markets, trade and value chains 1c: Increase resilience of livelihoods and systems 1d: Strengthen governance of natural resources
Objective 2: Strengthened systemic capacity to implement and deliver results	2a: Strengthen capacity for planning 2b: Strengthen policies and institutions 2c: Strengthen leadership, coordination and partnerships 2d: Enhance skills, knowledge and agricultural education 2e: Strengthen data and statistics 2f: Institutionalize mutual accountability 2g: Increase public and private financing

Source: World Bank, Science for Agriculture Consortium in Africa, 11 May 2017

<sup>41</sup> In Ethiopia, for example, the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) is a key climate strategy that guides other growth and development plans (FDRE 2012). The strategy recognizes that Ethiopia will be highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Kenya's Climate Smart Agriculture Program (CSAP 2015-2030) envisions "a climate resilient and low carbon growth sustainable agriculture that ensures food security and contributes to national development goals in line with Kenya Vision 2030" and also is thought to be crucial for coordinating domestic and international CSA interventions. In the preparation of the CSAP (2015-2030) Kenya combined the efforts of two ministries—the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. In Tanzania, and in addition to the Vision 2025, the government has sought to align responses to climate change and the promotion of CSA with broader investment and industrial strategies. Initiatives include the finalization of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP II), which is intended to run for from 2017-2026 taking into account climate change. There is also the Agriculture Sector Environment Action Plan aimed at promoting sustainable production; the Climate Smart Agriculture Programme; and the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan which also identifies climate change as an issue of concern. Climate Smart Agriculture Guidelines to guide implementation of the CSA Programme (2015-2025) have also been developed, identifying six strategic priorities as sources of Tanzania's agricultural development and growth in a changing climate, as follows: (1) improved productivity and income; (2) building resilience and associated mitigation co-benefits; (3) value chain integration; (4) research for development and innovations; (5) improving and sustaining agricultural advisory services; and (6) improved institutional coordination.

## Countries with CSA Profiles/CSAIP in Africa



Source: World Bank, June 2020

Illustrated by the case of Tanzania's Climate Smart Agriculture Programme and Resilience Programme, the key elements of the CSA programme respond to regional and international commitments on climate change, environment and sustainable development, and the CAADP. Through the CAADP, there has been increased investment by governments, the private sector, development partners and other stakeholders in the agriculture sector. These investments have taken different forms, which include supply of subsidized inputs, provision of agricultural extension services to farmers in rural areas, supply of subsidized machinery for cultivation, processing and value addition to agricultural produce and weather information services. The CAADP compact brought consultative frameworks into agriculture policy, strategy and investment programmes, a key component required for effective CSA transition by African countries.

It is in the foregoing context that the AU launched the GRAP in July 2021 and the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032 to bring coherence and coordination to the continent's responses to climate change as it recovers from the devastating COVID-19 pandemic.

These interventions are organizing frameworks for prioritizing and mobilizing coordinated interventions for adaptation and mitigation measures already put forward in countries' NDCs, NAPs and Green Growth Strategies, including Africa's Agenda 2063 and the UN SDGs. They offer opportunity to build capacity for integrating climate change considerations into national and regional development processes, policies and programmes and supporting the development of national systems of innovation across countries.

**African Countries with INDCs, First NDCs, Revised FIRST and Second NDCs**

No	Country	INDC	First/Second/Updated/Revised NDC
1	Algeria	✓	✓
2	Angola	✓	✓
3	Benin	✓	✓
4	Botswana	✓	✓
5	Burkina Faso	✓	✓
6	Burundi	✓	✓
7	Cabo Verde	✓	✓
8	Cameroon	✓	✓
9	Central African Republic	✓	✓
10	Chad	✓	✓
11	Comoros	TBC	✓ (First NDC)
12	Cote d'Ivoire	✓	✓
13	Democratic Republic of the Congo	✓	✓
14	Djibouti	✓	✓
15	Egypt	✓	✓
16	Equatorial Guinea	✓	✓
17	Eritrea	✓	✓
18	Eswatini	✓	✓
19	Ethiopia	✓	✓
20	Ghana	✓	✓
21	Guinea	✓	✓
22	Guinea Bissau	✓	✓
23	Guinea-Bissau	✓	✓
24	Kenya	✓	✓
25	Lesotho	✓	✓
26	Liberia	✓	✓
27	Libya	TBC	TBC
28	Madagascar	✓	✓
29	Malawi	✓	✓
30	Mali	✓	✓
31	Mauritania	TBC	✓ (First NDC)
32	Mauritius	✓	✓
33	Morocco	✓	✓
34	Mozambique	✓	✓
35	Namibia	✓	✓
36	Niger	✓	✓
37	Nigeria	✓	✓
38	Republic of Congo	✓	✓
39	Rwanda	✓	✓

40	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	TBC	TBC
41	São Tomé & Príncipe	✓	✓
42	Senegal	✓	✓
43	Seychelles	✓	✓
44	Sierra Leone	✓	✓
45	Somalia	✓	✓
46	South Africa	✓	✓
47	South Sudan	✓	✓
48	Sudan	✓	✓
49	Tanzania	✓	✓
50	The Gambia	✓	✓
51	Togo	✓	✓
52	Tunisia	✓	✓
53	Uganda	✓	✓
54	Zambia	✓	✓
55	Zimbabwe	✓	✓

Source: [Climate watch](#)

## Annex 2: Durban+10 Synthesis Report Assignment Delivery Modalities

Approach  (1)	Methodology  (2)	Scope of Assignment	Stakeholders & Development Partners for Consultation  (3)	Key Documents to Consult  (4)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General or consolidated to country specific analyses.</li> <li>2. Use of consultation notes to seek clarifications and guidance from FARA and DeSIRA_LIFT</li> <li>3. Reference and application of case studies, where applicable.</li> <li>4. Presentation to FARA and DeSIRA_LIFT of Advisory memorandum and application guide on documents produced.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Analytical research and critical review of documentation listed in column (4)</li> <li>2. Survey of stakeholders and development partners listed in column (3) using survey instruments</li> <li>3. Interview of stakeholders and development partners to follow up on survey responses where necessary</li> <li>4. Consultation of expert opinions</li> <li>5. Organization of focus group meetings as may be requested by institutions or required by the assignment</li> <li>6. Bilateral discussions with very senior development managers – agriculture, environment and climate change ministers, etc.</li> </ol>	<p>The delivery of this assignment will be limited or guided by the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Decisions that were formally adopted by UNFCCC CoP meetings of 17-26 and reported by the UNFCCC secretariat.</li> <li>2) Implementation reports by African countries as contained in their Adaptation Communications to UNFCCC on policy actions in response to the CoP Decisions.</li> <li>3) Emissions reduction proposals contained in African countries' updated NDCs, the latest of which were submitted to UNFCCC for the CoP26 meeting.</li> <li>4) The African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032. The African Climate Change Strategy 2020-2030 on which the assignment ToRs were based was a working document. It was finalized as the African Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032. There will be a critical review of this strategy so as to provide areas of possible improvement to the AUC. Given the broad coverage of the strategy, this assignment will focus on the priorities of the Axis that deals with food systems as they relate to climate smart agriculture.</li> <li>5) The African Union Green Recovery Action Plan (GRAP) 2021-2027 that was adopted by the African Union Summit of February 2022.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Ministries of agriculture, climate change, environment, natural resources of AU Member States</li> <li>2) Africa's Regional Economic Communities</li> <li>3) Key African institutions – AUC, AUDA-NEPAD, Pan African Parliament (committees on agriculture and climate change) AfDB, Afrexim Bank</li> <li>4) FARA, SROs, AFAAS</li> <li>5) Agricultural research, development and knowledge institutes and networks</li> <li>6) Leading regional, continental and international agricultural research and development organizations</li> <li>7) Development partners and institutions supporting climate smart agriculture in Africa</li> <li>8) Major investors, businesses and entrepreneurs in the agriculture sector</li> <li>9) Private foundations and development champions in climate smart agriculture</li> <li>10) IGOs and INGOs and NGOs like Pan African Farmers Organizations in climate smart agriculture</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) FARA Africa Climate Smart Agriculture Framework (ACSAF), MTOps, S3A, CSA-related discussions on the knowledge platform, annual reports, among other documents</li> <li>2) AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032, AU Green Recovery Action Plan 2021-2027</li> <li>3) AUDA-NEPAD Climate Resilient Agriculture programmes</li> <li>4) RECs CSA-related strategies and programmes</li> <li>5) AfDB CSA support strategy and programmes</li> <li>6) Multilateral Development Institutions (EU, FAO, IFAD, World Bank, etc.) CSA support strategies and programmes for Africa</li> <li>7) UNFCCC CoP17-26 Decisions and Decisions in respect of agriculture and food systems</li> <li>8) African countries' adaptation communications (ADCOM) to UNFCCC</li> <li>9) African countries' updated NDCs and implementation progress reports</li> <li>10) African countries' Covid-19 Economic Recovery Plans, NDC-aligned NDPs.</li> <li>11) CAADP and Malabo Declaration documents</li> <li>12) Other relevant documentation</li> </ol>

### Annex 3: Assignment Activities, Deliverables and Timelines

No.	Deliverables/Activities	Timelines	Remarks
1	Discussions, conclusion and signing of assignment contract	21 <sup>st</sup> - 25 <sup>th</sup> July	
2	Launch of assignment, comments on/ clarification of ToRs and delivery of Draft Inception Report to FARA and DeSIRA_LIFT	26 <sup>th</sup> July - 9 <sup>th</sup> August	
3	Finalization, review and approval by FARA and DeSIRA-Lift and dispatch of assignment survey instruments to stakeholders and partners and conduct of interviews	10 <sup>th</sup> -15 <sup>th</sup> August	
4	Review of documentation, research, preliminary consultations and delivery of Interim Report for the FARA 14-16 September 2022 CSA Biennial Conference: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interim Synthesis Report on CoP 17-26 Decisions and Policy Actions in respect of CSA (broadly agriculture and food systems)</li> <li>• Interim CSA Implementation Plan for AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032</li> <li>• PowerPoint Presentation by consultant for the Conference</li> </ul>	31 <sup>st</sup> August	Given that the assignment only started at the end of July, it will be difficult to present a final report for the September Biennial Conference. The interim documents will however be robust enough to provide guidance for the meeting.
5	First Draft Report (two documents in item 4 – incorporating inputs from surveys and guidance from the FARA 14-16 September CSA Biennial Conference	15 <sup>th</sup> September	
6	Transmission of First Draft Report (two documents in item 4) to FARA and DeSIRA_LIFT	16 <sup>th</sup> September	
7	Revision and transmission of comments to consultant by FARA and DeSIRA_LIFT	21 <sup>st</sup> September	
8	Revision of Draft Report based on transmitted comments and guidance	26 <sup>th</sup> – 29 <sup>th</sup> September	
	Dispatch of Final Report consisting of the Synthesis Report on CoP17-26 Decisions and Policy Actions and the CSA Implementation Plan for the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032	30 <sup>th</sup> September	

## Annex 4: Consolidated Durban+10 Survey Responses

### AFRICA CLIMATE SMART AGRICULTURE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN & SYNTHESIS REPORT ON UNFCCC CoP DECISIONS ON AGRICULTURE AND SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYSTEMS IN AFRICA

In the Context of AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032 and AU Green Recovery Action Plan 2021-2027

Respondents Positions	Director, Officer/Minister; principal livestock officer, Chief Director/Director Rural development/Assistant Director/ Assistant Director/Deputy Director
Countries Submitting Questionnaires	Lesotho; Malawi, Eswatini, Malawi, Tanzania, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe

#### PART II:

#### Climate Smart Agriculture and Sustainable Food Systems Policy Actions

#### in Response to UNFCCC Conference of Parties (CoP) Decisions

- 6) On a scale of 5-0 (5=excellent, 0=Not aware) kindly rate the extent to which the Government/Ministry of Agriculture is aware of the major decisions in the area of agriculture and food systems reached at CoP17 – CoP26. Please, tick (✓) as appropriate:

Level of Awareness of CoP Decisions	Excellent	V e r y Good	Good	Fair	Poor	Not aware	AVERAGE
	(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
Awareness of Agriculture and Sustainable Food Systems Decisions at CoP17 – CoP26	X		XXX	XXX	X		21/8 2.6/3.0 About good

- 7) Which of these CoPs decisions had the most profound influence on your country's climate smart agriculture policy actions? Please, identify the related agriculture and food systems decision, if possible:

No	Conference of Parties Decision	Related Agriculture and Food Systems Issues	Please, tick (✓) as appropriate	Not Aware
1	CoP26, Glasgow, Scotland, 31 October to 13 November 2021	7 Issues within KJWA Adaptation plans Access to financing mechanisms adaptation fund, GEF, GC  Pursuing SDGs 2030 related Programmes on food security and CC actions and Environmental Sustainability	X	XXXXXX
2	CoP25, Madrid, Spain, 2-15 December 2019	7 Issues within KJWA Adaptation plans Access to financing mechanisms adaptation fund, GEF, GCF	X	
3	CoP24, Katowice, Poland, 2-14 December 2018			
4	CoP23, Bonn, Germany, 6-17 November 2017 <sup>42</sup>	Setting the climate change standards. It has the effects on appropriate approaches towards agricultural innovations development.	X	
5	CoP22, Marrakech Kingdom of Morocco, 7-18 November 2016	Issues within KJWA Access to financing mechanisms adaptation fund, GEF, GC	X	
6	CoP21, Paris, France (Paris Climate Conference), 30 November - 11 December 2015	Reduction of greenhouse emissions, mitigation and adaptation of climate change effects, financing mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries.	X	
7	CoP20, Lima, Peru, 1-14 December 2014			
8	CoP19, Warsaw, Poland, 11-23 November 2013			
9	CoP18, Doha, Qatar, 26 November - 8 December 2012			
10	CoP17, Durban, South Africa, 28 November - 11 December 2011 <sup>43</sup>			

8) Which of the following frameworks or actions of your country's climate smart agriculture programme were developed in response to CoPs decisions? Please, tick (✓) as appropriate:

No.	Frameworks & Actions in Climate Smart Agriculture	Please, tick (✓) as appropriate										(%)
1	Climate smart agriculture policy	X	X	0	0	X	X	0	0	X	X	56
2	Climate smart agriculture strategy	0	0	X	X	0	X	0	0	X	X	44
3	Climate smart agriculture investment plan	0	X	0	0	0	0	0	0	X	X	22

<sup>42</sup> CoP 23 was a pathbreaking meeting. It introduced the KORONIVIA Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA).

<sup>43</sup> CoP17 launched the Green Climate Fund (GCF). It mandated UNFCCC SBSTA to start work on LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) and expansion of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to include additional land use, land-use change and forestry activities.

4	Climate smart agriculture capacity development programme	X	X	X	0	X	0	X	0	X	67
5	Climate smart agriculture financing arrangement	X	X	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22
6	Climate smart agriculture support systems	0	0	X	0	X	0	0	0	0	22
7	Climate smart agriculture national stakeholder consultative and knowledge sharing platform	X	X	0	0	X	0	0	0	0	33
8	Climate smart agriculture gender framework	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	National estimates of the GHG emissions from the agriculture sector	0	X	X	X	X	0	0	0	0	44
10	Cost estimates for transition from conventional to climate smart agriculture practices	0	X	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
11	Expected level of GHG emissions reduction that climate smart agriculture practices will bring about in the country	0	0	X	X	X	0	0	0	0	33
12	Others (please, specify)										

9) On a scale of 5-0 (with 5=excellent and 0= not aware), kindly rate the effectiveness of the CoPs in addressing agriculture and food systems issues in their agendas and adopted decisions. Please, tick (✓) as appropriate:

CoP Effectiveness Ratings	Excellent	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor	Not Aware	Average
	(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	19/8
Effectiveness of the CoPs on Agriculture and Sustainable Food Systems		XX	XX	XX	X	X	2.4 Fair

10) Based on your experience in the implementation and management of climate smart agriculture policies, strategies and programmes, what key issues should Africa put forward on its position at CoP27 with respect to agriculture and sustainable food systems? List at least 3.

1. Unlocking the bottlenecks restricting or limiting access to climate finance
2. More capacity building on climate action for agriculture to enable technology development and transfer
3. Capacitate parties to empower or engage private sector on climate action
4. Resilient seed production and increased support of indigenous seeds adaptive to climate change
5. Increase supply and affordability of climate smart machinery and implements
6. Strengthen early warning systems and service delivery
7. Develop policy for CSA and incentives for adoption of technologies
8. Need for increasing access to adaptation and mitigation financing
9. Increasing extreme weather events have exposed millions of people, especially small-scale farmers, low-income households and indigenous peoples in developing countries, to acute food and water insecurity.
10. Agricultural systems are vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change
11. Safeguarding food security and ending hunger and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems should be prioritized.
12. Agroecology should not be imposed on Africa since they are already practising
13. Africa should have one voice and be allowed to integrate traditional practices and modern production technologies to avert food insecurity (integrated soil fertility management)
14. Capacity for measurement, reporting and verification of greenhouse gases should be developed across all African countries
15. Innovation and technology
16. Rural finances
17. Food and nutrition security, including Gender roles
18. Policy
19. Investment
20. Capacity building

**11) Based on your experience in the implementation and management of climate smart agriculture policies, strategies and programmes, what kind of improvements would you like to see in CoP decisions on agriculture and sustainable food systems in meeting climate change goals and targets? List at least 3:**

- 16) Addressing the seven issues and others that may be identified and make decisions to move these topics ahead
  - 17) Capacity building (including available negotiation training packages online) and information exchange in a more structured arrangement with frequent stocktaking.
  - 18) Continued training on negotiations help developed countries participants benefit out of COPs instead of floating most of the times
  - 19) Establishment of specific topics that could follow up implementation and assist where there is need.
  - 20) The constituted bodies and operating entities of the Financial Mechanism should prioritize addressing issues related to agriculture in their existing mandates and work plans.
  - 21) There should be more emphasis on improving sustainable production and animal health, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the livestock sector while enhancing sinks on pasture and grazing land, which can contribute to achieving long-term climate objectives, taking into account different systems and national circumstances.
  - 22) Existing tools for assessing and monitoring adaptation and its co-benefits could benefit from further adjustment and new tools could be developed for country-specific circumstances.
- 
- 1) Benchmarking climate smart agriculture practices in Africa
  - 2) Capacity building of extension and research organizations
  - 3) Participatory technology development
  - 4) Access to finance for rural farmers
  - 5) Adoption of the food systems approach (production to marketing)
  - 6) Nutrition awareness and link to early childhood development
  - 7) Policy must be harmonized at all states levels
  - 8) Support for less developed nations
  - 9) Strengthening research collaboration between north and south

**1) Based on your experience in participating at the CoPs, please comment on what has not worked well and should be changed in respect of Africa and responses to climate change challenges in the agriculture sector.**

1. What has not gone well is lack of understanding for parties to support constant participation throughout the year
2. Apart from working on preparations for COPs maybe Africa should include sessions of stock-taking (achievements, challenges and information exchange) to assess if countries are indeed benefitting from COPs
3. Adoption of foreign-developed and not locally tested technologies as a way to reduce the vulnerability of food systems to climate change.
4. Never attended
5. I have not participated in CoP
6. Inadequate information and inadequate participation of technocrats from Africa

2) Based on your experience in participating at the CoPs, please comment on [what has worked well](#) and need to be reinforced and strengthened for effectiveness in respect of Africa and responses to climate change challenges in the agriculture sector.

7. *Having preparatory meetings for Africa both virtual and physical is a strong point worth keeping*
8. *Acquiring funding for countries also strengthens Africa's position even though not all countries would be covered*
9. *The development of solutions that are context-specific and country-driven, and strategies and their implementation of strategies that are scaled up and customized for local conditions.*
10. *Never attended*
11. *I have not participated in CoP*
12. *All countries are invited*

# DURBAN+10 SYNTHESIS REPORT

Lombard

